ACME An International Journal for Critical Geographies

Uneven Desintegration and Fragmenting Development: Jordanian Special Economic Zones and the Question of Migrants' and Refugees' Integration

Stefanie Hürtgen

Division of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Salzburg
stefanie.huertgen@plus.ac.at

Maximilian Hofmann

Department of Development Studies, University of Vienna
a01220547@unet.univie.ac.at

Abstract

In the global political economy, special economic zones are considered an established instrument for promoting social and economic "development" and recently also for refugee activation and integration. The Jordan Compact, a bilateral agreement between Jordan and the European Union adopted in 2016, represents an exemplary practical political implementation of this approach. So far, however, Syrian refugees` integration is meager. Extending the existing critique of the Jordan Compact, we propose to bring in an uneven and fragmenting development perspective. We in particular focus on the global production networks of the textile and garment industry and the working and living conditions in their Jordanian special economic zones. Referring to current debates on global production and labor regimes, and with a strong empirical focus, we underline the need of a multiscalar or glocal political-economic approach to the zones and we discuss their specific repressive labor regime, including the significance of transcontinental circular migration for it. We show how this zonal labour regime functions as a barrier to "integration" of Syrian refugees. Overall, we argue that contemporary fragmenting globalization produces uneven, non-substitive forms of socio-spatial disintegration, and that a break with the prevailing logic of "activation" and "development" is required.

Keywords

Uneven development, labor regime, global production networks, special economic zones, glocalization, Jordan

Introduction: Refugee Integration via Special Economic Zones?

The so-called refugee crisis continues, with almost 80 million people on the run worldwide in mid-2020, amongst them 6.6 million people from Syria (UNHCR 2021a). In the scientific and development policy debate, the crisis is accompanied by calls for a paradigm-shift in international refugee policies. *Passive* humanitarian care and camp accommodation should be replaced by *active* integration into the local labor market (Zetter & Raudel 2018). In the debate, the establishment of *special economic zones* (SEZs) is seen as a key economic and development policy instrument towards local activation. In that respect, the intervention of development economists Alexander Betts and Paul Collier (2015, 2017) became prominent. SEZs would combine the different comparative advantages of industrialized vs. developing countries, i.e. capital, companies and financial power on the one hand, and cultural and geographical proximity to refugees on the other. Betts and Collier's proposal received wide attention and has been further varied, for example as *refugee special economic zones* with liberalized trade and investment conditions (Moberg and Reil 2018), or so-called *sustainable development zones* (SDZ Alliance 2018).

In political terms, the European Union (EU) is particularly promoting this paradigm shift in migration policy, and the *Jordan Compact* agreed between the EU and Jordan in 2016 is considered as exemplary implementation.[1] The agreement proclaims to turn the refugee crisis in Jordan into a "development opportunity" (Government of Jordan 2016). The core of the Jordan Compact consists of provisions that are designed to promote the formal labor market integration of Syrian refugees, while concomitantly boosting exports of goods from Jordan's SEZs to the EU (EC 2016a). Critics, however, consider the Compact a neoliberal top-down project and they condemn Jordan's continuing discriminatory labor market policies which hardly allow Syrian refugees to build a self-reliant life beyond informal employment (Lenner & Turner 2019; Burlin 2019).

In our paper, we build on these critical debates, but with a specific focus on uneven development and labor. We, more precisely, see the need to integrate a global political economy and particularly a Global Production Network (GPN) perspective into the critical debate on the Jordan Compact and the role of SEZs for refugee-integration. It is indeed the global textile and apparel industry that was target to benefit from a specific Jordanian zonal development strategy and that is one of the important stakeholders of the Jordan Compact. Reminding on the role of SEZ in the global economy, we therefore turn to those Jordanian SEZ that function as production sites for the global textile and garment industry and that have allowed Jordan to become an international hub for this industry in recent decades. Here, however, in these textile and apparel SEZ we find specifically bad working conditions for a mainly *Asian* workforce, constituted via transcontinental circular migration. Drawing on recent literature on GPN and labor regimes (Baglioni et al. 2022), we analyze these working conditions as a specific *zonal labor control regime* (Jonas 1996; Azmeh 2014a for Jordanian apparel SEZ) that we refer to as authoritarian-despotic (Burawoy 1985; Anner 2015),[2] and we argue that it is a central barrier to integrating *Syrian* refugees into the corresponding SEZs.

Overall, we take a multiscalar or *glocal* perspective (Swyngedouw 1997) and we invite to consider the question of Syrians "integration" in the light of contemporary uneven respectively fragmenting development (Smith 2004; Scholz 2004). Indeed, dynamic socio-spatial fragmentation is the basic form of the contemporary neoliberal globalization (Hürtgen 2022), and SEZs stand paradigmatically for this. In this perspective, the zonal labor control regime that we will discuss is not

[1] A similar agreement was concluded with Ethiopia.

[2] As will be discussed in chapter 5, we take despotism as a category from labour process theory, absolutely not following the stereotypizing "orientalization" of Arab societies by Western thinkers and politicians (Ventura 2017)

simply local in character, but a glocal phenomenon, and it is socio-spatially disintegrative for both, Asian workers and Syrian refugees.

The text is structured as follows: In chapter 1 und 2 we discuss our theoretical approaches. We start with SEZs in the global political economy, and in chapter 2 we situate ourselves in recent debates on GPN and labor regimes. In chapter 3, we critically present the Jordan Compact, in chapter 4, we discuss Jordan's zonal development strategy and the role of transcontinental circular migration in it. Chapter 5 presents the zonal despotic labor control regime that is to be found in the textile- and garment SEZs, in chapter 6, we resume the incompatibility of this zonal labor regime with socio-spatial integration of Syrian refugees, and we conclude in chapter 7. Our work is based on a two-weeks qualitative field study with expert interviews in 2019, as well as subsequent supplementary exploratory interviews via skype and extensive secondary analysis.[3]

Special Economic Zones and Fragmenting Development

When we speak of special economic zones in the following, we focus on SEZs as macroeconomic instruments targeting translocal, often directly global, productive capacities. We will show below that precisely these SEZs are at the heart of the Jordan Compact and its "development-opportunity" affirmation.[4] SEZs in the global or better: glocal political economy are for decades considered the preferred policy instrument for generating "development" and "growth", especially but not exclusively in the Global South (Akinci/Crittle 2008; UNCTAD 2019). With the crisis of Fordism and the associated process of transnationalization of production, SEZs experienced an enormous upswing that continues to this day. Complex global production networks (GPN) are emerging, splitting up their production steps for their flexible restructuring across regions, countries and continents, in order to achieve highest possible flexibility and cost reduction in uncertain and short-term structured global markets. National, regional, and local socio-political regulations do become permanently compared location-factors in the global sourcing across countries and continents,[5] and Capital's competition over profits manifests, on all socio-spatial scales, into spatial competition over investment (Harvey 2014). Typical zonal-specific incentive policies to attract investment and to generate "development" are particularly low corporate taxes, cheap provision of land and infrastructure, an extensive administrative support of the investors (also for reinvestment) and labor policy conditions, deviating from national regulations. SEZs are therefore ideal-typical institutions of globalization as *glocalization*: The *downscaling* of socio-political (and ecological) standards is the very form of an *upscaled* capitalist competitive ratio beyond regions, nation-states and continents (Swyngedouw 1997). *Glocalization* is another way to say that with the regional integration into transnational technology- and capital-rich production networks, of interest are not (low) taxes or wages per se, but the (constantly) lower standards in relation to other zones, countries or continents. It is the socio-spatial *difference* that counts as incentive and (potential) competitive advantage for investors. FDI-led development therefore is *fragmenting development*; socio-spatial unevenness is constitutive for current (neoliberal) globalization (Scholz 2004; Hürtgen 2022).

Unsurprisingly, there has been massive criticism of SEZs for decades, with particular focus on working and living conditions because the "liberation" from national labor laws, formally or de facto, leads to non-reproductive working conditions and overexploitation (Fernández-Kelly 1983; Wright 2006;

[3] The experts come from different Jordan NGOs, we assured them anonymity because they asked for it. Generally, it is clear that the issue of the working and living conditions in SEZs is a difficult topic to negotiate in public or with (white) foreigners.

[4] Local and urban SEZs, such as the Enterprise Zones established in the U.K. since the 1980s, include similar measures such as tax breaks, etc., but function as micropolicy instruments for the development of small urban or rural areas and are targeted at local neighborhood economies.

[5] Here the concept of SEZs overlaps with that of export processing zones, both of which are geared towards the production capacities of large transnational companies and production networks.

Cross 2010; Neveling 2017). A "policy of exhaustion" (Gunawardana, 2016) is reported with extremely long working times and short-term and forced overtime. This issue is gendered because the so-called *low-end* of production experiences particularly extensive relocation, i.e., labur processes that are considered technologically and qualification-wise undemanding and are correspondingly low-paid and characterized by a high proportion of women (Fröbel et al. 1977). Taylorized mass production in the electronics or textile industries, forming a network of *Global Sweatshops* (Mezzadri 2017) stands paradigmatically for this process. Until today, the *global assembly industry* (Wilson 1991) continues to provide the bulk of the - majority female - workforce in SEZs (UNCTAD 2019).

Local Labor Control Regimes and the Global Textile and Garment Industry

The global textile and apparel industry is at the forefront of both the transnational restructuring of production and the political promotion and offensive use of SEZs. The industry is structured as a classic "buyer-driven" production network, in which retail chains and brand manufacturers represent the center of power and can impose strong cost and flexibility pressures on their suppliers (Gereffi 1994). Approximately 70 million workers are employed in the global garment industry, 40 million of them in Asia. What is important for our case: The further trade liberalization (namely the expiry of the Multi-Fiber Agreement MFA in 2005) and the turbulences of the 2008ff. crisis led to consolidation processes, in which Asian suppliers developed into powerful transnational corporations (Merk 2014) – and Jordan into an important hub of the apparel industry (Azmeh&Nadvi 2014). In Europe, Turkey and Southeastern Europe, as well as the wider periphery in North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt) are relevant production locations.[6] The advances towards the Jordan textile industry contained in the Jordan Compact can be seen as an attempt to include the country in the wider periphery of Europe (see below).

From a labor geography perspective, we theorize SEZs as Local Labor Control Regimes (Jonas 1996, Burawoy 1985). The concept asks about the specifically local configurations of exploitation and reproduction conditions and emphasizes the interplay of local firm policies, (state) forms of regulation and control and workers' agency. In recent years, an intensive discussion has developed on the connection between GPN and labor regimes (Baglioni et al. 2022). Detailed case studies show the interplay of (global, European, national, regional and local) state policies and transnational corporate strategies produce specific local social practices and institutions, thus constituting working and living conditions (Pattenden 2016, Smith et al. 2018).

Four conceptual strands of this recent debate are particularly central to an analysis of the Jordan's garment SEZs: *First*, we generally follow the multiscalar perspective in the construction of labor control regimes. Accordingly, the concrete conditions at the workplace are part of the regional, national, and global political economy; the local shaping of the labor regime is de facto an interaction between these scales and corresponding actors. *Second*, we follow Mark Anner (2015) who takes up and further differentiates Michael Burawoy's (1985) notion of a "despotic" labor regime with reference to the global garment industry. "Despotism," in short, is a fundamental category in labor process theory that describes particularly repressive and objectifying labor policies, especially the denial of social rights and of workers as individual subjects or collective actors. In addition to Burawoy's despotic *market* regime (disciplining workers through high market dependence due to an oversupply of labor), Anner identifies an "authoritarian state labor control regime" (state repression of independent union activity and protest, for example in China and Vietnam) as well as an "employer-employee repression regime" (direct threat and use of violence by employers, for example in Colombia). We see here, more generally, that the

[6] The spread of the *fast fashion* model with its intensification of time-competition provoked a re-regionalization of value chains to the near and far periphery of the EU (Smith et al. 2014). Accordingly, exports from Turkey and South-East Europe and North Africa to the EU have increased significantly over the last 15 years, with doubling or tripling figures in Turkey or Morocco (Comtrade 2021).

"integration" of workers goes far beyond mere "market participation" but also includes socio-political dimensions, and we see, moreover, that violence and political coercion are by no means outside the real existing "modern" global production networks. In the following we argue that the zonal regime of the garment industry in Jordan represents a glocally constituted *authoritarian despotic* regime.

The *third* theoretical avenue related to the GPN-Labor Regime debate is the concept of *dormitory regimes* (Smith&Pun 2004; Andrijasevic 2022, see also Azmeh 2014a). In fact, many SEZs in the low-wage or low-end production sector are organized as dormitory regimes because they often rest upon inner and external migrant workers. As regimes, dormitory SEZ focus on "order and discipline" and the surveillance of especially the often (young) female workers. As to the labor process, dormitory regimes "compress" the workplace and living space of workers, enhancing management's control and pressure in the managing of the highly flexible production, basically when it comes to extended working hours at short notice during peak order periods in the transnational just-in-time organization of production. Finally and *fourth*, dormitory SEZs are crucial components of the polit-economic "making" of transnational migration and labor markets (Brown 2019; Shire 2020). In particular, and for our case very important, *circular migration* not only reflects uneven and fragmented working and living conditions, but it *creates* them along a transnational policy of segmented or non-citizenship (Castles & Özkul 2014).

To summarize: With reference to the GPN-Labor Regime debates and the four specifications mentioned above, we analyze the zonal labor regime of the Jordanian garment industry as a glocally constituted authoritarian-despotic dormitory regime that is simultaneously organized as a circular migration regime. As we will now show more in detail, such a glocal politeconomical and geographical perspective is necessary to broaden the view on the causes of the hardly successful (activating) integration of Syrian refugees into the Jordanian textile and garment SEZ.

The Jordan Compact and its Export-Oriented Design

Since the first Arab-Israeli war in 1947-1949, Jordan has been a haven for refugees mainly from the Palestinian territories, Iraq and Syria. Today, the country is home to about ten million people, with 1.3 million being Syrians (Ghazal 2016), 666,000 of them are registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2021b). With the migration crisis, heightening in the “migration summer” of 2015, the EU-policy strategically shifted towards an exchange of trade preferences for ‘keeping refugees close to home‘ (Panizzon 2019, 229). The Jordan Compact is an exemplary result of this. It was presented to the public in 2016 and it granted concessional loans and other financial assistance to Jordan from the EU and the World Bank of around $1.7 billion in total.[7] In return, Jordan committed to create 200,000 jobs for Syrian refugees by the end of the contract term (originally set at ten years), mainly through the issuance of refugee work permits for certain sectors (agriculture, construction) and within refugee camps, as well as for the eighteen SEZs existing in Jordan at this time (EC 2016b).

One of the core elements of the compact, and of particular importance from an economic- and labor-geographical perspective, is the provision for preferential trade access to the European market for the Jordanian export-industry, associated with facilitated so-called *rules of origin*. Here, also the role of SEZs is crucial. On the one hand, Jordan was granted duty-free market access for goods from SEZs, given that a certain share of Syrian refugees shall contribute to the workforce of companies producing in these zones (initially 15%, from the 3rd year 25%). On the other hand, the rules-of-origin-criteria for export were relaxed: first the required local share of value-added manufacturing activity in Jordan for duty-free exports has been lowered (from 60% to 30%) and second, specifically for the garment industry,

[7] We will not go deeper into general normative representations here, such as the role of security, democracy policy etc.

the necessary local (Jordanian) processing of garments were reduced from "double" to "single" transformation before exporting (EC 2016c, see also Curran et al. 2019).

What becomes apparent here is that the Jordan Compact is directed less at the local medium, small and micro enterprises that make up 90 % of the Jordanian industrial sector, but rather at the global and transnational investors and exporters who operate on a large scale. With a total of about 77,000 employees and a share of 28 % of all Jordanian exports, this is primarily the textile and clothing industry (ILO 2020a). Indeed, together with the UNHCR, the Jordan Ministry of Labor, the Jordan Investment Commission, the Jordan Industrial Estates Company and the World Bank, the sectoral representative bodies of the textile and garment industry (the *Jordan Garments, Accessories and Textiles Exports Association* and the *Textiles Export Association*) are important stakeholders of the Jordan Compact (Lenner &Turner 2019, 81).

However, the results of Syrian refugees' SEZ-labor market integration are limited[8] particularly when it comes to export-oriented SEZ. Only in textile and garment, some 1.500 Syrian refugees are employed (making 4% of the total workforce, ILO 2020a), in the other export-manufacturing SEZs, such as plastic, the number is even lower, with only some hundred Syrians at best (ILO 2020b). The political response to this mixed record has been a reform of the Jordan Compact, with a further strengthening of export promotion while *de facto* abandoning labor policy objectives. Preferential access to the EU's internal market will be granted now to all Jordanian companies after reaching 60,000 work-permits on a national level (previously 200,000), and preferential access to the EU-Market becomes decoupled from the previously required 15% share of Syrian refugees in the companies' workforce. In parallel, the compact was extended until 2030 (EU-Jordan Association Committee 2018). We will see below that the abandonment of the required quota of Syrian employment secures the authoritarian-despotic SEZ-labor regime, particularly that of the global textile and garment industry.

Proponents of the activating refugee policy typically cite a bundle of factors as reasons for the meager integration-results especially in SEZs: costly commuting distances, lack of childcare, insufficient qualifications of Syrians, or culturally determined reservations about mixed gender relations in the workplace (Amjad et al. 2017). Also dissatisfaction among Syrian refugees with wages and working conditions prevailing in Jordanian SEZs is registered but largely presented as technically and regulatory solvable challenges (Huang & Gough 2019). Critics, in contrast, discuss the Jordan Compact as a neo-liberal top-down project and an example of globally circulating standard solutions, with unawareness and lack of sensitivity to regional politico-economic contexts (Soederberg & Tamakkol 2020). Jordan's segmenting labor market policy would be systematically ignored and the danger of deportation would push them into informalized jobs (Burlin 2019; Morris 2020).

In what follows, we will address these criticisms but seek to expand them to include a glocal political economy and labor geography view. The non-integration of Syrian refugees as workers into the garment SEZ is result of both, Jordan's deregulating and segmenting labor market policy *and* a highly repressive transcontinental employment strategy by the firms of the global apparel industry.

Jordan: Zonal Development and Authoritarian Circular Migration

Jordan, like other countries of the Global South, experienced a profound crisis of its import-substitution model and, since the late 1980s, turned to a strategic reorientation toward economic liberalization and FDI-led development. With an aggressively supply-oriented approach, the explicit goal was now to become a platform for international investors, especially in the garment industry. Jordan's

[8] Although officially approximately 178,000 work permits for formal employment were issued between 2016 and 2019 (JML 2020), the number is not clear and definitively much lower as there is a cumulative counting method calculating annual renewals, the estimation is about 45.000 permits (Gordon 2019).

zonal development strategy (Lenner & Turner 2019) is crucial in this process. SEZs have been established as so-called *Qualifying Industrial Zones* (QIZs) with the Oslo peace process from 1997 onwards. They in the beginning functioned as an administrative component of the US-Israeli free trade area with preferential access to the US market, and namely Israeli garment producers took advantage of lower production costs and market access. Since then, Jordan has established a diverse system of wide-ranging tax and duty relief mechanisms along different sub-types of SEZs[9]. Today, with the above mentioned restructuring of the branch, in particular turning Asian suppliers into powerful big corporations, nearly all larger the garment and apparel companies are subsidiaries of a mostly Asian parent company (Enclude BV and CMC 2019). While fabrics, yarn and other materials are imported mainly from China[10], Jordan functions as a low-cost production location for final processing steps and for duty-free exports. The country has established itself successfully and against regional competitors, in particular Egypt, as a regional hub for textile production. As Azmeh (2014a, b) shows in detail, the particular repressive zonal dormitory labor regime described below was crucial in this spatial competition, as it allowed for the establishment of a particularly flexible, efficient, and low cost production. The apparel industry - which had previously played hardly any role in Jordan - has become the country's central economic factor, with around 20% of Jordan's GDP and 25% of all exports.[11] So far, however, the strategic polit-economic deployment of the EU remains relatively unsuccessful, with modest exports to the EU ($57 million in 2018) and an unbroken orientation towards the US market (87% of all garment exports).

This successful zonal development strategy, however, is inscribed in an offensive labor market deregulation and segmentation policy with a decisive low-cost-orientation. *Generally*, Jordan has a restrictive quota system for foreign workers in so-called "closed professions", hindering migrants and refugees to work beyond low-paid jobs such as construction or agriculture (Amjad et al. 2017), which is, as mentioned, repeatedly discussed in relation to the hardly successful integration of Syrian refugees and that the overall small number of new working permits for Syrians are small (see last chapter). Additionally, it is important to note labor market segmentation contains a fragmented minimum wage-policy between Jordanians and migrants, but *also* between sectors producing in the SEZs and the residual economy (Almasri 2021). While for example the minimum wage for Jordanians rose in 2021 and is announced to increase also for “non-Jordanian workers” outside the SEZs[12], the SEZ-garment workers are (again) exempted from this adjustment (Jordan Times 2020).

Even more important, however, when it comes to when it comes to garment SEZs as part of deregulation and segmentation policy: Their labor force is in a direct sense transcontinental constituted via an established system of circular migration mainly from South-Asia (Azmeh 2014a; Tappe and Nguyen 2019). Since around 2004, Asian garment producers as the nowadays central players in Jordan's garment hub, have been systematically recruiting workers from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India or Nepal to employ them in Jordan (typically for three years). They offensively pushed for an increase of the permitted Asian-employment quota in SEZs, which indeed has been steadily increased (up to 80% in February 2019, Better Work Jordan 2019).[13] Recruitment and management of Asian workers (based on their economic needs and lack of alternative income there) rest upon a transcontinental circular migration

[9] Examples are the so-called *Development Zones* established from 2008 on to support structurally weak regions (AmCham Jordan 2016) or recently the so called “satellite units”, addressing directly the textile and apparel industry. “A satellite unite is a garment manufacturing factory, usually of small scale, located outside the QIZ or the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and wholly owned and managed by existing garment manufacturers” (ILO 2020a: 19).
[10] 48.7% of Jordan's total textile imports in 2018 came from China (Comtrade, 2020).
[11] Exports grew from $56 million in 1999 to $1.7 billion in 2018.
[12] Increase was from 230 JOD ($324) to 260 JOD ($367) for Jordans and is announced to rise up to 245 JOD for “expatriate workers”
[13] Accordingly, for example in 2017, 49,000 workers from Bangladesh, 17,000 from the Philippines, 16,000 from India and 10,000 from Sri Lanka were located in Jordan.

regime, involving state authorities, hybrid or private agencies and middlemen of the respective Asian countries and the Jordanian government (Damir-Geilsdorf 2016). Jordan NGOs and the ILO advocate excluding private brokers from the recruitment process to establish some social regulation, however they still play a decisive role in providing information, documents or tests prior to the departure. Generally, sanctioned mechanisms for violations of recruitment regulations (for example irregular increase of fees) are not foreseen (ILO 2017, 2019a) [14].

Finally, but not least: In the transcontinental constitution of the SEZs labor force, Jordan and the Asian garment companies apply the so-called *Kafala* system, Arabic for "sponsor" (traditionally applied to migrants in the Arab Gulf states, Lebanon and Jordan). It means that the job-facility and stay is strongly tied to the employer who, as a "sponsor", organizes work permits, accommodation and visas as well as their annually renews (Frantz 2013; ILO 2017). While for the Asian migrant-workers, a change of occupation or termination of employment without the employer's consent is nearly impossible, the employer is free to send them back - and companies are taking advantage of this threat potential, as we will see. In response to massive criticism from NGOs and the former official classification of the Jordanian garment sector as forced labor by the U.S. Department of Labor, the *Kafala*-system officially no longer applies to textile production in the SEZs. However, as the widespread critique of NGOs and also our research shows, in its structure it continuous to exist.

To summarize this chapter: We see here in a nutshell how socio-spatial fragmentation is a multiscalar phenomenon and how on each scale it is constitutive for GPN and the global political economy. The Jordan garment-SEZs are not “local” but *glocal* in character when they foster and accelerate socio-spatial unevenness of working and living conditions in the name of globalized norms of capitalist competitiveness. Moreover, we can see that socio-economic unevenness is far from being an innocent supply and demand “market”-phenomenon. Rather, it is politically constituted, in our case by offensive policies of labor market deregulation and segmentation and the transnational constitution of non-citizenship.

Authoritarian Despotic Glocal Labor Control in Jordanian Special Economic Zones

Before returning to the question of why *Syrians* do not enter the SEZ as workers, we need to analyse the authoritarian-despotic character of the zonal labor control regime regarding its *Asian* workforce.

The Asian garment workers typically come to Jordan for a three-year contract period, without their family and for the intention of earning the highest possible income. 80% of them are women (ILO 2017). They work in production[15] and live in the SEZ, situated typically in fenced-off and peripheral located areas. Currently, the global textile industry is mainly located in three SEZs: the QIZs Al-Hassan near Irbid and Al-Dulayl near Zarqua, and the Sahab Development Zone in the suburban area of Amman. Social contacts to the outside world are almost non-existent, rather there is extensive spatial, social, cultural and linguistic isolation (Azmeh 2014a). Garment manufacturers arrange meals and lodging in company-owned dormitories near the factories, and accommodation is in rooms with typically 8-12 people. Visits outside are allowed during the day, but in practice they are limited due to long working hours and low wages (see below). SEZs are locked overnight, women must enter the dormitories before

[14] In Bangladesh, for example, the official fees charged by the Bangladeshi migration office amounts to around $230 but quite a few workers reportedly had to pay up to $1400 in total, related to “additional services” from private brokers and recruitment agencies. Generally, high migration costs lead workers into economic distress, also because they must take out loans with interest rates of up to 16% to cover the expenses (GAATW 2019).

[15] As often, the hierarchical division of labour is racialized. Jobs in management, design or development are available for (young) Jordanians, whereas the blatant policy of over-exploitation of the Asian workers described here is officially “justified” with their “lack of qualification” (The Business Year 2019).

9 pm; men can apply for overnight stays outside, permission is given by management. Especially for women there is strong surveillance of their "behavior" (GAATW 2019). Living conditions are problematic, hygienic and structural deficiencies are sometimes portrayed as hazardous to health; in winter, lack of heating and hot water is reported (Hofmann 2020).

Better Work Jordan (2019, 2020) estimates that two-thirds of labor contracts in the garment industry are illegal under Jordanian law. Workers typically have to "work off" their debts to the employment agencies at the beginning of their stay (up to $1000) and it is still common practice to confiscate workers' passports until the employment contract expires. Intimidation and threats of deportation for "undisciplined" behavior on the part of management are common. Wages are far below the official poverty line.[16], not geared to life outside the SEZ, they force the workers to live within the SEZs. As to working conditions, the *policy of exhaustion* described above also applies to the Jordan garment-SEZs. Workers are regularly forced to work extensive overtime to meet short-term production goals. On average, the working-week is 60h in six days but 90h and more a week are also reported (Better Work Jordan 2020).

We have to add here that due to massive criticism by NGOs of the blatant labor rights violations in the SEZs (for example National Labor Committee 2006), on the initiative of the ILO and the World Bank the "Better Work Jordan" monitoring program was launched in 2008. As already mentioned, also more labor recruitment regulation was foreseen, with for example official job advertisements and precise information on working conditions, wages or accommodation in SEZs (ILO 2017). However, the persistently critical NGO-reports and our own research show that so far there has been no significant change in the structure of the garment SEZ-labor regime. Instead, what we see is an *authoritarian-despotic zonal labor control regime* in the sense of Mark Anner (2015), because the restrictive and coercive labor conditions are not the result of labor-market-"oversupply", but there is direct repression from (national and international) state apparatuses and employers, in particular via a transnationl policy of non-citizenhip. Garment-SEZs are repressive *dormitory regimes* (Pun et al. 2019), functioning as *Asian enclaves* within Jordan (Azmeh 2014a), isolating and vulnerabilising the mostly female Asian workforce. The *dark side* (Phelps et al. 2018) of Jordan's zonal development model and its success, hence, is a policy of exhaustion and, moreover, the violation and abuse of fundamental social rights. Coercive elements in labor policy, however, are likewise common in GPN employment-strategies and their offensive cost-competition strategies, and they are a systematic component of the current global political economy (Barrientos et al. 2013; McGrath 2013, Anner 2015; LeBaron & Phillips 2019).

Despotic Exploitation, the Jordan Compact and the Quest for the Integration of Syrian Refugees

The analysis of the authoritarian-despotic zonal garment regime has significance for the discussion of SEZs as instruments of activating refugee policy. As a reminder, in the first version of the Jordan Compact, valid for two years, export facilitation was linked to a 15% or 25% quota of Syrian refugee employment in SEZs. This target was missed by a wide margin, whereupon the Compact was amended - the facilitated exports are now possible without a Syrian employment quota (see chapter 2). Meanwhile, numerous employment creation initiatives by multiple international organizations and NGOs engage for more refugee integration. The ILO for example established in total 13 job centers specifically for Syrian refugees since 2016, two of them in the refugee camps of Zaatari and Azraq, providing assistance with issues around work permits, the search for jobs or career planning (ILO 2019b). The ILO

[16] They are at 125 JOD ($176) and 95 JOD ($134) in-kind for food and accommodation in the dormitories (Better Work Jordan 2019). The absolute poverty line in Jordan is at 528 JOD or $745 for a family of five in 2019 (Tamkeen 2019). These wages are the result of a collective agreement negotiated between the Jordanian Textile Workers' Union and the Jordanian textile producers' associations (JGATE et al. 2019). Previously, foreign workers in the garment industry received only about half of the minimum wage for Jordanians (110 JOD = $155).

also expanded the supply of vocational training programs, focusing on the certification and enhancement of already available skills as well as on-the-job training for manufacturing sectors. The often-cited issues of transportation and care obligations for Syrian women have been partly addressed through the provision of transportation and childcare facilities by garment firms (Gordon 2019). Nevertheless, results are definitively limited, even when figures differ. The ILO (2020a, 40) reports 1.500 Syrian refugees in the textile and garment SEZ (out of 77.000 thousand, see above) and adds even much lower figures for other export-oriented SEZ[17]. The organization Aghulas (2020) speaks about 355 Syrians in all EU-exporting companies under the Compact scheme. The picture did not change even when working permits for SEZ were opened to camp residents, a group that was assumed to be more prone to take up low-paid jobs (Lenner 2020, 295).

Against this background, how do we assess the Jordan Compact and the propagated idea of activating integration of (Syrian) refugees into the Jordanian labor market by means of SEZs? The argument of many critics of the Compact that Jordanian labor market segregation and discrimination against Syrians persists is undoubtedly correct but it falls short in relation to the garment industry SEZs.

Rather, the glocal analysis adopted here shows the importance of politc-economic socio-spatial fragmentation as a barrier to refugees' integration. In fact, we see a double but uneven disintegration. Or to put it differently: *Where* shall Syrian refugees integrate into? Within the existing setting of socially vulnerable and exhausting labor and living conditions for both, Syrian refugees *and* Asian migrants, it is not in the interest of Syrian refugees (nor of the textile manufacturers, see below) that Syrians do become zonal workers. The focus on integration into SEZs – after all, the widely propagated basic idea of the Jordan Compact with the Textile-SEZs as its core - is off target, because the working conditions are anything but socially integrating from the perspective of the Syrian refugees, living typically in large family-groups either within or outside the camps (Grawert 2019; Lenner 2020, 294ff.; UNHCR 2021c).

Rather, Syrian refugees are structurally opposed to the zonal labor regime. Even when they participated in vocational training programs and even when they would or could pay high transportation costs to reach SEZs, wages there are, for them, far from being sufficient for survival. The system of circulating migration and despotic over-exploitation of Asian migrants is based on a minimal but guaranteed provision with accommodation and food within the zones. For Syrians, these wages would by far not be sufficient for a life outside the zones and the covering of the high Jordanian costs of living. Unlike labor migrants from South Asia, they have to feed and care for their families. In fact, wages are higher in the informal sector than in the export industry (Amjad et al. 2017, 48) so we can say that the textile and apparel industry plays a direct role in *pushing* Syrian refugees to the informal sector (ibid). Also the work rhythm with the very long working days and regularly peaks is seen by Syrian refugees as totally incompatible with their and their families local life (ibid.). In fact, Syrians perceive the working conditions described above as extraordinarily hard, insecure and exploitative (DSP 2020). Hence, the vast majority of them (officially estimated 70%) continue to work informally, mainly in agriculture and construction, despite the Jordan Compact and its work-permit-perspective (JML 2021). In spite of their vulnerable, precarious status in the informal sector, the despotic zonal labor control regime is no option for them (see also the survey in Tiltnes et al. 2019, 130ff.).

Moreover, socio-spatial unevenness among Asian migrants and Syrian refugees refers not only to immediate working conditions, but also to the related but uneven precarious status of citizenship. We mentioned that unevenness and fragmentation is no "pure" economic, but always also political structure. As described above, Asian textile workers subordination under the despotic zonal labor regime heavily relates to a specific circular migration policy that creates non-citizenship. Syrian refugees, in contrast,

[17] In other SEZ-operating export-sectors, this figure is even lower with some 117 counted Syrians in the chemical industry ILO 2020b, 42).

typically have a precarious, often illegal residence status. Freedom of movement is restricted, mostly limited to certain regions. When Syrians live in camps, they have to renew their documents every 30 days to be able to leave the camp for work, a procedure reported to be inconvenient, bureaucratic and arbitrary (DSP 2020, 33). Transportation infrastructure is weak and dangerous, not least when it comes to controls by para-governmental groups (driving or owning a car is generally forbidden to Syrian refugees). Overall, the acceptance of formal but temporary employment contracts is hindered because it requires registration by those state authorities that are often perceived as hostile, and it moreover increases the risk of deportation (Morris 2020, 92ff.). In short: while the policy of non-citizenship binds Asian textile and garment workers to SEZs, it otherwise prevents Syrian refugees from entering SEZs as workers. Both forms of non-citizenship are vulnerable and disintegrative and they are constituted as fragmented, non-substitutive to each other.

Not least to mention: Also the association of Jordanian garment producers is reluctant to Syrian refugee employment. They categorically rejected its increase in the run-up to the negotiations for the Compact (Lenner & Turner 2019). Contrary to official rhetoric, they insist on the need to employ Asian workers. Not coincidentally, the amendments to the Jordan Compact, as described above, *de facto* abolished the Syrian employment rate and integrated sectors outside the SEZs into the framework of simplified rules of origin. Obviously, the circular Asian migration and labor regime seems to work well from the perspective of textile producers, while a higher Syrian employment rate could bring uncertainties, such as at least the possibility of higher wage demands. The above-mentioned abandonment of a Syrian employment quota in SEZs must therefore be seen as a stabilization of the existing glocal despotic labor regime. In all, however, it must be critically assessed whether work in the over-exploitative despotic zonal labor regime of Jordanian garment factories "should count as a 'success' or be a humanitarian target in the first place" (Turner 2019).

Conclusion

Throughout the current debate on zonal, activating refugee policy, we discussed the export-oriented textile and garment SEZ in a critical polit-economic and uneven and fragmenting development perspective. Textile and garment SEZ are at the heart of both, the Jordan economy and the Jordan compact as a propagated pioneer scheme for refugee integration. We have discussed in detail Jordan's zonal development strategy and we have shown the appearance of a zonal despotic labor regime in the Jordanian garment SEZ that is glocal in character and that rests upon over-exploitation via repressive transcontinental policies of non-citizenship and segmenting labor market policy. This zonal despotic labor regime is an integral part of a globalized garment and textile industry characterized by intense cost competition. This industry, as others, relies on highly flexible and exhaustive working conditions, some of which, as in Jordan, include elements of forced labor. The zonal despotic labor regime – together with other factors, first of all the denial or disregard of citizen-rights – is a structural barrier to significant employment of Syrian refugees in Jordanian SEZs. The Under given conditions, however, such an employment, would be anything but integration. Socio-spatial fragmentation as the basic form contemporary economic globalizisation turns out to be a structural limit for integration of both Asian migrants and Syrian refugees.

In a critical geographical perspective, there are at least three general conclusions at this point. The *first* is the need to *reject post-colonial ahistorism* (see in detail: Lenner 2020). The joyful narrative of the SEZ creation with foreign capital in the name of a win-win situation conveys classical views of the South as need to be stimulated by Western intervention. It moreover neglects the whole system and history of existing SEZs as an integral part of the (Jordanian and Global) political economy, their functioning and their deeply problematic sides. *Secondly* and spatially, our analysis has shown the need to reject over-simplified juxtapositions of "local" refugees and "global" (or Western) capital (helping them via the creation of SEZs). Workers, refugees and others, are far from being pure local "supply".

This false dualism "oversees" their glocal constitution in multiscalar socio-spatial relations that transcend the globe and that are multiscalar. *Thirdly*, the concept of *activation* – as that of workers as local supply –neglects the need to discuss the *quality* of the working and living conditions and the need of effective labor and social rights. Hence, activation and integration turn out to be marketization-logics, while any other social practices and activities, i.e. social reproduction in a comprehensive sense, are split off into a passive nowhere.

These three points, and many more, underline the need to question the prevailing logic of globalization, "development" and "integration". In our article we hope to have shown that for this purpose, a view on the different and uneven forms of fragmentation and disintegration is necessary.

Acknowledgements

We thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive engagement with our text and their valuable critiques and comments. Special thanks also go to Jean-Baptiste Lanne, who encouraged us throughout the process and in the end made a spirited, wise restructuring proposal that improved the text quite significantly.

References

Agulhas. 2020. Independent Monitor's Assessment Report: Jordan Compact and Brussels meetings. London.

Akinci, Gokhan and James Crittle. 2008. Special economic zones: Performance, lessons learned, and implications for zone development. Washington DC: The Worldbank Group.

Almasri, Shaddin. 2021. The Political Economy of Nationality-Based Labor Inclusion Strategies: A Case Study of the Jordan Compact, Middle East Critique, 30:2, 185-203.

AmCham Jordan. 2016. In brief: Development & free zones in Jordan. Amman

Amjad, Renad, Jafaar Aslan, Emma Borgnäs, Divya Chandran, Elisabeth Clark, Alessandro Ferreira dos Passos, Jaiwon Joo and Ola Mohajer. 2017. Examining barriers to workforce inclusion of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Better Work Discussion Paper 21. Geneva.

Andrijasevic, Rutvica. 2022. The dormitoriy regime revisited. In *Labour Regimes and Global Production,* edited by Baglioni, Elena, Campling, Liam, Coe, Neil, Smith, Arian Newcastle uT: Agenda Publishing.

Anner, Mark. 2015. Labor control regimes and worker resistance in global supply chains. *Labor History* 56(3), 292–307.

Azmeh, Shamel. 2014a. Labour in global production networks: Workers in the qualifying industrial zones (QIZs) of Egypt and Jordan. *Global Networks* 14(4), 495–513.

Azmeh, Shamel. 2014b.Trade regimes and global production networks: the case of the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Egypt and Jordan. In: Geoforum, (57), 57–66.

Azmeh, Shamel and Khalid Nadvi. 2014. 'Greater Chinese' global production networks in the Middle East: The rise of the Jordanian garment industry. *Development and change* 44(6), 1317–40.

Baglioni, Elena, Campling, Liam, Coe, Neil, Smith, Arian (Eds.) 2022. *Labour Regimes and Global Production*. Newcastle uT: Agenda Publishing.

Barrientos, Stephanie, Uma Kothari and Nicola Phillips. 2013. Dynamics of unfree labour in the contemporary global economy. *Journal of Development Studies* 49(8), 1037–41.

Better Work Jordan. 2019. Annual report 2019. Geneva

Better Work Jordan. 2020. Annual synthesis report 2020. Geneva

Betts, Alexander and Paul Collier. 2015. Help refugees help themselves: Let displaced Syrians join the labor market. *Foreign Affairs* 94, 84–92.

Betts, Alexander and Paul Collier. 2017. *Refuge: Transforming a broken refugee system.* London: Penguin Books.

Burawoy, Michael. 1985. *The politics of production.* London: Verso.

Burlin, Alexander. 2019. Empowerment through development? Towards a political critique of the 'Jordan Compact'. *Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration* 8(1), 123–36.

Castles, Stephen, Ozkul, Derya. 2014. Circular Migration. Triple Win or a New Label for Temporary Migration? In *Global and Asian Perspectives on International Migration* edited by Graziano Battistella, New York: Springer: 26-37.

Comtrade. 2021. UN Comtrade Database. https://comtrade.un.org/data/. (20.05.2021).

Cross, Jamie. 2010. Neoliberalism as unexceptional: Economic zones and the everyday precariousness of working life in South India. *Critique of Anthropology* 30(4), 355–73.

Curran, Louise, Khalid Nadvi and Liam Campling. 2019. The influence of tariff regimes on global production networks (GPNs). *Journal of Economic Geography* 19(4), 873–95.

Damir-Geilsdorf, Sabine. 2016. Contract labour and debt bondage in the Arab Gulf states. Policies and practices within the Kafala system, In, Damir-Geilsdorf, Sabine, Ulrike Lindner, Gesine Müller, Oliver Tappe and Michael Zeuske (eds.), *Bonded labour*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

DSP, Durable Solutions Platform. 2020. In my own hands: A medium-term approach towards self-reliance and resilience of Syrian refugees and host communities in Jordan. New York: Columbia University.

EU-Jordan Association Committee. 2018. Decision No [1]/2018: UE-RHJ 3301/18.

EC, European Commission. 2016a. EU-Jordan: towards a stronger partnership. Press release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2570_en.htm. (20.05.2021).

EC, European Commission. 2016b. Annex to the joint proposal. JOIN(2016) 41 final ANNEX 1. Brussels.

EC, European Commission. 2016c. Proposal for a council decision. COM(2016) 403 final - 2016/0188 (NLE). Brussels.

European Union. 2002. Euro-Mediterranean agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their member states, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part. *Official Journal of the European Communities* 129, 3–165.

Fernández-Kelly, Mária Patricia.1983. For we are sold, I and my people. Women and Industry in Mexico's frontier. Albany, State University of New York Press.

Frantz, Elizabeth. 2013. Jordan's unfree workforce: State-sponsored bonded labour in the Arab region. *The Journal of Development Studies* 49(8), 1072–87.

Fröbel, Folker, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye. 1977. *Die neue internationale Arbeitsteilung.* Reinbek: Rowohlt.

GAATW. 2019. "*I wish I never would have to wake up again*": Material conditions and psychological well-being of Bangladeshi women garment workers in Jordan. Bangkok.

Gereffi, Gary. 1994. The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S.-Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks. In *Commodity Chains an Global Capitalism* edited by G. Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, London: Preager: 95-122.

Ghazal, Mohammad. 2016. Population stands at around 9.5 million, including 2.9 million guests. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/population-stands-around-95-million-including-29-million-guests. (20.05.2021).

Gordon, Jennifer. 2019. Refugees and decent work: Lessons learned from recent refugee job compacts. EMPLOYMENT Working Papers 256. Geneva.

Government of Jordan. 2018. Jordan response plan for the Syria crisis 2018-2020. Amman.

Grawert, Elke. 2019. Between aid dependence, neighbourhood solidarity and the EU-Jordan Compact: Livelihood analysis of Syrian refugees in Greater Amman. BICC Working Paper 4/2019. Bonn.

Gunawardana, Samanthi. 2016. 'To finish, we must finish': Everyday practices of depletion in Sri Lankan export-processing zones. *Globalizations* 13(6), 861–75.

Hofmann, Maximilian. 2020. *Syrian Refugees in Jordan Special Economic Zones*. Unpublished Masterthesis, Universität Salzburg.

Harvey, David. 1999. The limits to capital. London: Verso

Hürtgen, Stefanie. 2022. Uneven Despotization: Labour Regimes in Glocal Production. In *Labour Regimes and Global Production*, ed. by Baglioni, Elena, Campling, Liam, Coe, Neil, Smith, Arian. Agenda Publishing: Newcastle uT: 173-190

Huang, Cindy and Kate Gough. 2019. The Jordan Compact: Three Years on, Where Do We Stand? https://www.cgdev.org/blog/jordan-compact-three-years-on. (20.05.21).

ILO. 2017. Migrant, domestic and garment workers in Jordan: A baseline analysis of trafficking in persons and related laws and policies. Geneva.

ILO. 2019a. Presence of human trafficking and forced labour in labour migration in Sri Lanka. Geneva.

ILO. 2019b. Programme of Support to the Jordan Compact: Progress Report 2018. Amman.

ILO. 2020a. Skills for Trade and Economic Diversification (STED) in the Garment & Leather Manufacturing Sector. Beirut

ILO. 2020b. Skills for Trade and Economic Diversification (STED) in the Chemicals and Cosmetics Manufacturing Sector. Beirut.

JGATE, AOFWG and GTUWTGCI. 2019. Collective Agreement dated 21 November 2019. Amman.

Jonas, Andrew. 1996. Local labour control regimes: Uneven development and the social regulation of production. *Regional Studies* 30(4), 323–38.

Jordan Times. 2020. Minimum wage to go up to JD260 at onset of 2021. http://jordantimes.com/news/local/minimum-wage-go-jd260-onset-2021. (20.05.2021).

JML, Jordanian Ministry of Labour. 2020. Syrian Refugee Unit work permit progress report December 2019. (26.03.20). Amman.

JML, Jordan Ministry of Labour (2021): Syrian Refugee Unit - work permit progress report December and annual 2020. Syrian Refugee Unit (SRU).

Lacouture, Matthew. 2021. Privatizing the Commons: Protest and the Moral Economy of National Resources in Jordan. https://www.cambridge.org/core. (28.07.2021)

LeBaron, Genevieve and Nicola Phillips. 2019. States and the political economy of unfree labour. *New Political Economy* 24(1), 1–21.

Lenner, Katharina and Lewis Turner. 2019. Making refugees work? The politics of integrating Syrian refugees into the labor market in Jordan. *Middle East Critique* 28(1)65-95.

Lenner, Katharina. 2020. "Biting our tongues": Policy legacies and memories in the making of the Syrian refugee response in Jordan. Refugee Survey Quarterly 39(3), 273–98.

McGrath, Siobhán.2013.Fuelling global production networks with slave labour?: Migrant sugar cane workers in the Brazilian ethanol GPN. Geoforum 44: 32-43

Merk, Jeroen. 2014. The rise of tier 1 firms in the global garment industry. *Oxford Development Studies* 42(2), 259–77.

Mezzadri, Alessandra. 2017. The Sweatshop Regime : Labouring Bodies, Exploitation, and Garments Made in India. New York, Cambridge University Press

Moberg, Lotta and Sebastian Reil. 2018. Refugee special economic zones. *Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy* 7(3), 290–303.

Morris, Julia. 2020. Extractive landscapes: The case of the Jordan refugee compact. *Refuge* 36(1), 87–96.

National Labour Committee. 2006. US Jordan free trade agreement descends into human trafficking and involuntary servitude. New York.

Neveling, Patrick. 2017. Capital over labour: Health and safety in export processing zone garment production since 1947, In, Prentice, Rebecca & Geert de Neve (eds.), Unmaking the global sweatshop. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 123-46.

Pattenden, Jonathan. 2016. Working at the margins of global production networks: Local labour control regimes and rural-based labourers in South India. *Third World Quarterly* 37(10), 1809–33.

Pun, N., R. Andrijasevic und Devi Saccetto (2019): Transgressing North-South Divide: Foxconn Production Regimes in China and the Czech Republic. In: Critical Sociology 46(2): 307-322.

SDZ Alliance. 2018. Sustainable development zones: Tools for economic development for communities in mass displacement scenarios. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d5488a97f30dd0001a098eb/t/5dc1bca9b0099d31d01aea9f/1572977833859/SDZ+Concept+Proposal+-+FINAL.pdf. (20.05.2021).

Smith, Adrian, John Pickles, Milan Buček, Rudolf Pástor and Bob Begg. 2014. The political economy of global production networks: Regional industrial change and differential upgrading in the East European clothing industry. *Journal of Economic Geography* 14(6), 1023–51.

Smith, Adrian, Mirela Barbu, Liam Campling, James Harrison and Ben Richardson. 2018. Labor regimes, global production networks, and European Union trade policy: Labor standards and export production in the Moldovan clothing industry. *Economic Geography* 94(5), 550–74.

Smith, Chris and Ngai Pun. 2006. The dormitory labour regime in China as a site for control and resistance. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 17(8), 1456–70.

Soederberg, Susanne and Lama Tawakkol. 2020. The humanitarian development nexus and the Jordan Compact: Tensions and trajectories in global capitalism. Journal für Entwicklungspolitik 36(4), 129–53.

Swyngedouw, Erik. 1997. Neither global nor local: "Glocalization" and the politics of scale, In, Cox, Kevin (ed.), *Spaces of globalization*. Perspectives on Economic Change. New York: The Guilford Press, 137–66.

Tamkeen. 2011. The weakest link: Migrant labour in domestic and QIZ sectors in Jordan in 2010. Amman.

Tamkeen. 2019. Subsistence level: The minimum wage in Jordan. Amman.

Tappe, Oliver and Minh T.N. Nguyen. 2019. Southeast Asian trajectories of labour mobility: Precarity, translocality, and resilience. *TRaNS* 7(1), 1–18.

The Business Year. 2019. Just on the mark. https://www.thebusinessyear.com/jordan-2019/just-on-the-mark/interview. (20.05.2021).

Tiltness, Age, Zhang Huafeng and Pedersen, Jon. 2019. The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Amman.

Turner, Lewis. 2019. Three years of the Jordan Compact: The (gendered) challenges of providing work permits for Syrian refugees. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/07/12/three-years-of-the-jordan-compact-the-gendered-challenges-of-providing-work-permits-for-syrian-refugees/. (20.05.21).

UNCTAD. 2019. *World Investment Report 2019: Special economic zones.* New York, Geneva.

UNHCR. 2021a. Refugee data finder. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics. (20.05.2021).

UNHCR. 2021b. Syria regional refugee response. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36. (20.05.21).

UNHCR. 2021c. Registered persons of concern refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan. https://data2.unhcr.org/images/documents/big_eb0cde856b02ff87409ff289d9ee7e86cef0e614.jpg. (21.05.21).

Ventura, Lorella. 2017. The "Arab Spring" and orientalist stereotypes: The role of orientalism in the narration of the revolts in the Arab world. *Interventions* 19(2), 282–97.

Wilson, Patricia A. 1991. The global assembly industry: Maquiladoras in international perspective. Journal of Borderlands Studies 6(2), 73–104.

Wright, Melissa W. 2006. Disposable women and other myths of global capitalism. New York, N.Y.; London, Routledge.

Zetter, Roger and Héloïse Ruaudel. 2018. Refugees' right to work and access to labour markets. *Forced Migration Review* 58, 4–7.