Policing Gentrification: The Financial Geography of Law Enforcement in Philadelphia

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Abstract

By contributing to dispossession along the gentrification "frontier," "broken windows" policing advances the territorial conquest of Black and Latinx neighborhoods. Enlarging the growing body of scholarship which examines the racialized effects of broken windows policing in U.S. cities, we scrutinize the geographical relationship between "broken windows" policing and gentrification in Philadelphia. Building on Neil Smith's spatial analysis of the gentrification "frontier," we examine the spatial pattern of broken windows policing to better understand how it interacts with the expansion of gentrification. We use mixed quantitative and qualitative methods to explore how the geographical relationship between gentrifying (or adjacent-to-gentrifying) neighborhoods and broken windows policing strategies. We then examine how these strategies contribute to racialized dispossession and displacement. The strategies we analyze—order-maintenance arrests and real property forfeitures—clearly reveal how police intervene into the financial geography of redeveloping neighborhoods.

Keywords
Gentrification, policing, property, Philadelphia

Introduction

In November of 2007 Toby Biddle, a self-described "third-generation real estate investor, speculator, [and] developer" from the affluent and predominantly white suburb of Lafayette Hill, attended a property auction hosted by the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office (DAO). Biddle now had his eye on a dilapidated building at the corner of Laurens Street and West Queen Lane in Germantown which he thought would make a profitable rental property. Narcotics police had performed an investigation into the building that had driven the DAO's decision to seize it through civil forfeiture. Biddle scooped it up for just $20,000 and quickly went to work converting it into four separate rental units. The property is now worth more than 13 times what Biddle paid and well over twice the money he spent on renovations.[1]

The history of Biddle and his buildings are representative of the long historical arc of racialized disinvestment that created the conditions for contemporary patterns of both policing and gentrification. The building stood in a section of Germantown that, in the 1930s, was rated "hazardous" for investment by the Homeowners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) due to an "infiltration" of foreign-born Italian residents and the "nominal" presence of Black residents—largely migrants who began to settle there during the Great Migration (Nelson et al. 2017). The legacy of this discriminatory financial exclusion cast a long shadow over Germantown as it underwent a racial transition and "white flight" during the 1950s (Hillier 2005; S. Smith 2018). Between 1950 and 2000, Philadelphia lost a quarter of its population and most of its manufacturing jobs. The consequences were concentrated in neighborhoods like Germantown that were becoming increasingly segregated.

In the 1970s, Germantown was predominantly Black and growing ever more impoverished as working-class Philadelphians faced declining employment prospects and the retrenchment of public services (Adams et al. 1993; Whalen 2001; Wilkes and Iceland 2004). During this time the Afro-American Federation (AAF) purchased what would eventually be Biddle's building as a meeting place. AAF was a social services organization that strove to buoy the neighborhood's poorer residents through these difficult years (N.A. 1970; Reilly 1971).

When the AAF became defunct in the 1980s, the building was abandoned, exemplifying the disinvestment sweeping through the city—which also coincided with the rise of the broken windows policing philosophy. Broken windows policing transfigured the literal broken windows of such buildings into criminogenic, racialized avatars of urban disorder. By the 1990s these abandoned buildings had become key nodes in the burgeoning drug economy that had risen from the ashes of the devastated manufacturing sector (Karandinos et al. 2014; Zucchino 1992).

Between 1993 and 2017 the Philadelphia DAO auctioned 1,696 properties that it seized due to alleged drug offenses through a civil legal process known as civil asset forfeiture. Biddle's companies purchased 36 of those properties, more than any other single entity. Like many of the properties auctioned by the DAO, the majority of those purchased by Biddle were within or adjacent to neighborhoods undergoing gentrification. It was through this long-term process of real estate disinvestment and reinvestment that Biddle and many others found the opportunity to profit from properties made available

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[1] Jackson Smith compiled the database of 1,696 properties forfeited and auctioned by the DAO by searching for deed transactions involving the DAO on the Philadelphia Department of Record's PhilaDox online property database.

to them by the city's narcotics policing apparatus.

Philadelphia's forfeiture program illustrates how disinvestment has shaped policing and how policing actively drives processes of gentrification. Using a mixed qualitative-quantitative methods approach, we build upon quantitative scholarship that has likewise found a link between indicators of gentrification and the prevalence of "postindustrial" or "order-maintenance" policing strategies (Sharp 2014; Laniyonu 2018). Our research goes beyond this established finding by revealing how policing creates opportunities for those who profit from the city's shifting boundaries of race and class.

Our findings confirm what is intimately understood by residents of neighborhoods targeted by both redevelopment and broken windows policing: that police interventions fuel dispossession and displacement, creating opportunities for those banking on gentrification (Fayyad 2017; Vo 2018; Autonomous Tenants Union 2018; McElroy and Werth 2019; Cahill et al. 2019). By scrutinizing the political economy of racialized dispossession in gentrifying Philadelphia, we build upon a rich body of interdisciplinary scholarship on the political economy of policing and mass incarceration in the United States (Garland 2002; Gottschalk 2015; Camp and Heatherton 2016). We also build upon recent scholarship that investigates the state's punitive financial interventions in poor communities (O'Malley 2009; Harris 2016; Jashnani, Bustamante, and Stoudt 2020) and policing as racialized spatial control (Beckett and Herbert 2011; Shabazz 2015). As Ruth Wilson Gilmore argues: "states are territorial resolutions of crisis" (2002, 16). In Golden Gulag (2007), she reveals how the state resolved a crisis of surplus economic capacity by using incarceration to absorb and discipline surplus workers. In tandem, we examine how Philadelphia's local government has used police to manage the social and political crises brought about by decades of disinvestment in Philadelphia's Black and Latinx neighborhoods.

Broken windows policing contributes to gentrification in Philadelphia by targeting Black and Latinx households. Majority Black and majority Latinx neighborhoods adjacent to gentrification experience higher rates of order maintenance arrests and property forfeitures. Both more affluent neighborhoods and adjacent neighborhoods with no racial majority have lower rates. These findings suggest that policing is not only reactive to gentrification, but also that policing fuels gentrification through racialized displacement and dispossession.

We argue that broken windows policing is an intervention into the city's already uneven financial geography that widens the geographic scale of gentrification. By targeting illicit economic survival strategies, burdening Black and Latinx households with the financial burden of arrests, incarceration, and confiscating homes, police prime zones of disinvestment for reinvestment. With forfeiture, policing literally creates opportunities for speculators like Biddle—who tend to be whiter and more affluent than the people from whom homes are seized—to invest in redevelopment. Contemporary policing therefore contributes to the processes of financial inequality and racialized dispossession that expand the geography of gentrification.

Literature Review

We have built upon the efforts of scholars and activists who contest how broken windows policing and contemporary urban development strategies reproduce spatialized inequalities of race and class in cities like Philadelphia (Camp and Heatherton 2016; Maharawal 2017; Autonomous Tenants Union 2018; Cahill et al. 2019). The broken windows theory was first put into practice by New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton in the 1990s and was subsequently exported around the world. The premise was that serious crimes are a consequence of "unaddressed disorder" such as broken windows, graffiti, and "quality of life" crimes, many of which, including "aggressive

panhandling, squeegee cleaners, [and] street prostitution," are economic survival strategies (Kelling and Wilson 1982; Bratton and Giuliani 1994). Broken windows policing produced a surge of misdemeanor arrests that disproportionately targeted the racialized poor (Harcourt 2005; Vitale 2008; Kohler-Hausmann 2018; Jashnani, Bustamante, and Stoudt 2020).

As Jordan Camp and Christina Heatherton argue, the strategy was really a solution to the political crises produced by urban deindustrialization. In a "veritable landscape of broken windows" pockmarking abandoned housing and factories, this strategy was a means of relocating disorder "within individuals, off-loading liability onto the bodies of the blamed" (5). They therefore call on scholars to attend to how broken windows expresses neoliberalism "at the urban scale" by "enabling the gentrification of cities" through the displacement of the racialized poor (2016, 2-3). We have taken up this call in our study of Philadelphia, using mixed methods to explore how broken windows policing resolves the social and political crises following decades of disinvestment by fueling racialized dispossession, reinvestment, and redevelopment.

Despite some scholarly attention to how contemporary policing interacts with uneven urban development regimes (Gibson 2004; Vitale 2008), there has been relatively little work that has explicitly examined the geographical relationship between broken windows policing and gentrification. Two important exceptions are Elaine Sharp's (2014, 359) revelation that "cities with postindustrial economies emphasize order maintenance policing" and Ayobami Laniyonu's (2018, 920) finding of a strong "association between gentrification and Stop and Frisk" in New York City. Laniyonu emphasizes patterns of development and differences in policing practices throughout the entire urban environment, rather than focusing on gentrifying neighborhoods or comparing different cities as Sharp had done. Laniyonu's approach allows him to identify important nuances in the spatial relationship between gentrification and policing, specifically that the "most dramatic impacts" of gentrification are indirect. Gentrification "does not necessarily induce heightened policing in the tract that experienced it, but significant policing in adjacent or neighboring tracts" (Laniyonu 2018, 920). As such, we also examine how adjacency to gentrification shapes policing.

Finally, by attending to the differences in how different zones of the racially segregated urban landscape are policed, we reveal how racial composition and gentrification status intersect to determine the degree of broken windows policing. Here we differ from Sharp, who found no evidence that a city's embrace of order maintenance policing was influenced by perceived "racial threat." By analyzing the relationship between policing and proximity to gentrification, we explore how broken windows policing reproduces the spatialized racial logic of gentrification. Our research demonstrates how police practices like home forfeiture create opportunities for speculators by dispossessing Black and Latinx homeowners in neighborhoods ripe for redevelopment.

Our effort to visualize the role of policing in shepherding real estate capital across Philadelphia builds upon Neil Smith's "rent gap" theory of gentrification—which considers both adjacency and race as factors in the geographic expansion of reinvestment (1996, 55–71). Using the gentrification of Manhattan's Lower East Side as his test case, Smith argues that an institutionally produced gap between actual and potential ground rents creates the necessary economic conditions for gentrification. Only after thorough disinvestment does profitable reinvestment become possible. The state's efforts to produce disinvestment include racial redlining, discriminatory housing policies, financial exclusion of the racialized poor, and the "predatory inclusion" of Black homebuyers in mortgage lending markets (Connolly 2014; Sugrue 2014; Baradaran 2015; Taylor 2019).

Further, Smith suggests that reinvestment follows disinvestment in the spatial and temporal form

of a frontier sweeping across the urban landscape. Developers and neighborhood boosters use colonial frontier imagery as they prime disinvested areas for reinvestment (1996, xv – xvi, 12 – 16). The trope of the frontier expresses the distinctive spatiality and temporality of gentrification while baring the colonial underpinnings of contemporary real estate strategies. Within the "settler" city, gentrifying areas become what Margaret Ramirez calls "borderlands," and contemporary strategies mirror earlier histories of "primitive accumulation" and capitalist dispossession (Ramirez 2019; see also: Marx 1976; Blomley 2003; Harvey 2005; Bhandar 2015; Singh 2016).

Smith suggests that broken windows policing secures zones of disinvestment adjacent to gentrification, fulfilling the political desires of a revanchist urban elite who view the city as having been stolen by the racialized poor, immigrants, and sexual minorities. Intensive policing further devalues areas of the city that are primed for reinvestment and territorial conquest. As home forfeiture demonstrates, policing can even cause what Smith calls the "physical change in… housing stock and the economic change in… land and housing markets" which facilitates gentrification (2006, 195). Smith does not, however, systematically analyze the geography of policing in relation to gentrification as we do in this paper.

A wide range of police practices comprise the policing of gentrification. These include upticks in petty service calls attributed to affluent newcomers (Vo 2018), gang injunction zones (Ramirez 2019), saturation policing using strategies like Stop and Frisk (Laniyonu 2018), and intensive policing of drug use and other vice infractions. In short, broken windows or order-maintenance theories drive the policing of gentrifying areas. As Bernard Harcourt suggests, the "order-maintenance approach to criminal justice" entails a variety of "theories and practices" with "subtle distinctions" among them; in both popular discourse and critical scholarship, these distinct approaches often fall under the banner of broken windows policing (Harcourt 2005, 23). Broken windows also best describes the policing we analyze here, both by describing a style of policing and evoking the transition from disinvestment—a landscape of literal broken windows (Camp and Heatherton 2016; Ansfield 2020)—to reinvestment.

Methods

In this paper we focus on two broken windows policing strategies: arrests for "order-maintenance" offenses and the seizure of real property for narcotics offenses. Our order-maintenance variable includes petty misdemeanors like loitering as well as vice offenses like drug possession. The law of civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to seize any property alleged to have been involved in a narcotics crime. Forfeiture actions are brought against the property itself, rather than against its owners. As a result, prosecutors bear a lower burden of proof than in criminal cases and property owners do not have to be criminally convicted, or even charged, to be deprived of their property.

Real property forfeitures are undertaken by the Philadelphia DAO's Public Nuisance Task Force (PNTF). The unit's emphasis on what its chief calls the "classic nuisances in a city environment" suggests a view that forfeiture is consistent with the basic broken windows proposition that physical disorder, such as an abandoned building alleged to harbor narcotics activity, is inherently criminogenic. The PNTF has routinely used forfeiture to target homes in poor Black and Latinx neighborhoods close to gentrifying areas, often for minor marijuana or crack cocaine offenses (J. Smith 2021).

We study the relationship between policing and gentrification from a critical perspective informed by our years of research experience in Philadelphia. During the summer of 2016 and all of 2018, Jackson Smith investigated civil forfeiture in Philadelphia through interviews with law enforcement officials, archival research, and an extensive review of forfeiture court records. As a critical historian of drug war policing, he seeks to understand how law enforcement strategies produce racial segregation and predatory development. Vanessa Massaro has conducted ethnographic research in

Philadelphia for over a decade, work that included a focus group with Black residents of the Grays Ferry neighborhood and a survey of 130 mostly non-white Philadelphians about the household financial burdens created by encounters with the criminal justice system. Massaro's years living in the city and her family ties to Grays Ferry offered her an intimate view of the city's rapid development and the displacement of Black residents (see Cuomo and Massaro 2014; Massaro and Cuomo 2017). Her contributions also grow from her teaching: she carried out the quantitative and spatial analysis for this paper with her undergraduate student Greg Miller, who grew up in a Philadelphia suburb and has embraced critical map-making to better understand the entrenched racial inequality of his home region (Massaro 2019). All three authors hold privileges of race, class, and gender identity that have led them to "study up" to understand how police wield power.

The quantitative analysis shows how the gentrification status of a given neighborhood (mapped in Figure 1) affects the spatial distribution of three dependent variables (mapped in Figure 3): arrest rates, order-maintenance arrests as a percentage of total arrests, and total real property forfeitures. We analyze these variables at the US census block group level, which provides the finest-grained geographic scale available in federally aggregated data. Arrest data is calculated from arrests in the year 2013 only. Incidents of real property forfeiture span the years 1993 – 2017. Order-maintenance arrests are based on the Universal Crime Reporting (UCR) codes for vandalism, prostitution, narcotics, gambling, liquor law violations, public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy/loitering. Gentrification status is based on a study by Ding, Hwang, and Divringi, who assigned each census tract in Philadelphia a variable of "gentrifying," "non-gentrifying," or "non-gentrifiable" (see Hwang, Ding and Divringi 2016 for raw data). The authors assign the label "non-gentrifiable" (e.g. wealthy neighborhoods that are by definition of their income not vulnerable to predatory redevelopment) to census tracts with median household incomes above the citywide median income in the year 2000. For the remaining census tracts that were "gentrifiable" (e.g. neighborhoods that are vulnerable to predatory redevelopment due to their poor and working-class status) in the year 2000, the authors assign either the variable "gentrifying" or "non-gentrifying" based on the change in both a neighborhood's property values (measured by median rent or home value) and its share of college-educated residents (to capture the socioeconomic status of newcomers) between 2000 and 2013. Census tracts were gentrifying if they experienced increases above citywide median increases for both property value and share of college-educated residents (Ding et al. 2015).

We conducted a linear regression analysis to compare the association between gentrification status (our independent variables) and arrests, order maintenance arrests, and real property forfeitures (our dependent variables). This analysis tests the association between these variables against the association between four independent control variables (race, education, income, and residential vacancy; see Table A2 and Figure 2) and our dependent variables. The model works by summarizing how multiple independent variables (X) can predict a single dependent variable (Y). The output of the multiple regression analysis is an equation in the form $Y = a + b_1 * X_1 + b_2 * X_2 + \ldots + b_p * X_p$. It is important to note that all the independent variables are categorical—they represent categories rather than numerical values.

Figure 1: Gentrification status by block group as categorized by Ding, Hwang and Divringi (2016). Map by Vanessa Massaro and Janine Glathar.

This collaborative project integrates the quantitative spatial analysis conducted by Massaro and Miller with Smith's and Massaro's broader qualitative research projects to explore the role of policing in the gentrification process in Philadelphia. This mixed methods approach offers a more nuanced understanding of the geography of contemporary policing than either quantitative analysis or qualitative research alone, by demonstrating how policing exacerbates the dynamics of disinvestment, gentrification, and dispossession.

Figure 2: Map of Dependent Demographic Variables. Block groups were put into categories based on how the block compared to city-wide averages for any given demographic variable. The block group categorizations are based on data from the US Census 2013 American Community Survey, accessed via https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data.html. Maps by Vanessa Massaro and Janine Glathar.

Figure 3: Dependent variables Data taken from Open Data Philly (accessed May 5, 2019: https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents). Jackson Smith compiled the database of 1,696 properties forfeited and auctioned by the DAO by searching for deed transactions involving the DAO on the Philadelphia Department of Record's PhilaDox online property database. Map by Vanessa Massaro and Janine Glathar.

Findings

We found that both order-maintenance arrests and forfeitures of real property occur most frequently along the edges between disinvestment and reinvestment, helping transform neighborhoods by specifically targeting underground economic activity. Moreover, forfeiture itself is a police intervention into the geography of Neil Smith's "rent gap," ensuring that properties along the "gentrification frontier" are available to speculators like Biddle. These findings establish a geographical relationship between broken windows policing and urban redevelopment. Our regression analysis establishes a positive association between broken windows policing and gentrification, while our qualitative research reveals how broken windows policing fuels racial dispossession along the

"gentrification frontier." Taken together, these two approaches illustrate a dialectical—even synergistic—relationship between policing and gentrification: police are clearly responsive to the city's geography of race and class as it is transformed by the dynamics of redevelopment. Broken windows policing in turn creates opportunities for those who stand to gain from gentrification, as the case of property forfeiture clearly illustrates.

Quantitative Findings

Our summary data offers a portrait of the uneven geography of policing in Philadelphia, showing that the gentrification status of a block group correlates with significant differences in arrest rates, the percentage of arrests classified as order-maintenance offenses, and the incidence of real property forfeiture (Table 1). Our multiple linear regression model confirms this correlation (Table 2). It shows that, when we control for each of our four demographic variables, the gentrification status of a neighborhood is significantly associated with variance in each of our dependent variables. Moreover, gentrification status is the only independent variable with a statistically significant relationship *to all three* of our dependent variables. The linear regression also demonstrates a statistically significant relationship between adjacency to gentrification and an increase in the overall arrest rate (a relationship also evident in the summary data in Table 3).

Table 1: Summary Data by Gentrification Category

	Non-Gentrifiable	Non-Gentrifying	Gentrifying	Not Adjacent to a Gentrifying Block Group	Adjacent to a Gentrifying Block Group
Total Block Groups	625	508	191	968	177
Total Arrests (2013)	59666	90231	30790	124464	30054
Total Real Property Forfeitures (1994 - 2017)	95	1275	326	1108	262
Total Population (2013)	771209	541796	213430	1132985	190289
Arrests per 1000 residents (2013)	77.36	166.54	144.26	109.85	157.94
Percent of arrests classified as "Order Maintenance" (2013)	14.35	19.15	16.63	17.46	15.62
Real property forfeitures per 1000 (1994 - 2017)	0.12	2.35	1.53	0.98	1.38

Table 2: Linear Regression Results

Independent Variables		1. Arrests Results	2. Order Maint. Policing	3. Property Forfeiture
Simple Gentrification	Non-Gentrifying	56.48***	1.45***	0.92***
		(9.46)	(0.54)	(0.21)
	Gentrifying	35.12***	1.44**	1.02***
		(10.37)	(0.59)	(0.22)
Adjacent to Gentrification	Adjacent to Gentrifying	26.20***	-0.004	-0.03
		(9.74)	(0.56)	(0.21)
Vacancy	Low Vacancy	-27.33***	0.05	-0.45***
		(7.93)	(0.45)	(0.17)
	High Vacancy	56.57***	0.86*	0.56***
		(9.12)	(0.52)	(0.20)
Race/Ethnicity	Black	-6.57	1.06**	0.66***
		(8.14)	(0.46)	(0.18)
	Hispanic/Latinx	21.14	5.52***	1.86***
		(17.01)	(0.97)	(0.37)
	White	0.01	0.48	-0.04
		(9.17)	(0.52)	(0.20)
Educational Attainment	Below Average Education	-10.02	1.11**	0.64***
		(8.75)	(0.50)	(0.19)
	Above Average Education	-2.22	-1.17**	-0.17
		(8.82)	(0.50)	(0.19)
Median Income	Low Income	37.72***	0.93*	0.65***
		(8.67)	(0.49)	(0.19)
	High Income	-6.47	-0.34	-0.03
		(8.96)	(0.51)	(0.19)
	Constant	100.93***	14.08***	0.3
		(9.69)	(0.55)	(0.21)
	Observations	1,324	1,324	1,324
	R-squared	0.21	0.11	0.23

Notes:

Dependent variable is labeled by column.

Estimates are OLS with standard errors in parentheses.

Reference categories are as follows: Simple Gentrification = Nongentrifiable; Adjacent = Not Adjacent to a Gentrifying Block Group; Vacancy = Average vacancy rate; Race/Ethnicity = No significant Majority; Educational Attainment = Average education rate; Median Income = Mid-range income

  *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The positive association we observed between a neighborhood's arrest rates and its status as either gentrifying or not yet gentrifying confirms Smith's (1996) suggestion that policing contributes to both disinvestment and reinvestment along the "gentrification frontier." The arrest rate in what Ding et al. (2015) term non-gentrifiable block groups—those too wealthy to be gentrified—is nearly half what it is in non-gentrifying block groups. Our regression analysis confirms this variance in arrest rates, yielding a statistically significant relationship between gentrifying or not yet gentrifying block groups and higher arrest rates. In other words, neighborhoods experiencing reinvestment (e.g. gentrifying block groups) *and* those experiencing disinvestment (e.g. non-gentrifying block groups) are both subject to more intensive policing than more affluent parts of the city. Intensive policing exacerbates disinvestment by marking poor neighborhoods as disordered and dangerous, while also securing areas undergoing reinvestment and facilitating profitable dispossession by inflicting the racialized poor with the financial burden of arrests, incarceration, and forfeiture.

Table 3: Summary Data for Adjacency by Gentrificatoin Category

	Non-Gentrifiable and Not adjacent	Non-Gentrifiable and Adjacent	Non-Gentrifying and Not Adjacent	Non-Gentrifying and Adjacent
Total Block Groups	554	71	406	102
Total Arrests (2013)	49480	10186	72879	17352
Total Real Property Forfeitures (1994 - 2017)	87	8	1021	262
Total Population (2013)	688607	82602	439007	102789
Arrests per 1000 residents (2013)	71.86	123.31	166.01	168.81
Percent of arrests classified as "Order Maintenance" (2013)	14.23	14.94	19.72	16.49
Real property forfeitures per 1000 (1994 - 2017)	0.13	0.1	2.33	2.47

An analysis of each block group's proximity to gentrification makes this relationship between policing and the geography of uneven development even more evident (see Table 3). Block groups that are adjacent to gentrifying block groups but are not themselves gentrifying have an arrest rate nearly 50

per 1000 higher than in block groups that are not adjacent to gentrification. Our regression analysis shows that this relationship between adjacency to gentrification and higher arrest rates is statistically significant, confirming the indirect effect of gentrification on the concentration of policing in nearby neighborhoods as Laniyonu noted.

Although we found a strong association between gentrification and intensity of policing, as measured by total arrests, we did not find a similarly strong association between policing and racial composition. According to our regression analysis, neighborhoods categorized as majority Black or Latinx did not have significantly more arrests than neighborhoods with no racial or ethnic majority. This finding highlights the significance of the strong association between intensive policing and a neighborhood's status as gentrifying or not yet gentrifying. Moreover, the intersecting effects of racial composition and gentrification status on the spatial patterns of policing are more evident when we turn to our more specific measures of broken windows policing: order-maintenance arrests and real property forfeitures.

We found a positive association between the percentage of arrests classified as order-maintenance and a neighborhood's status as either gentrifying or not yet gentrifying. This finding illustrates how broken windows policing targets the racialized poor along the "gentrification frontier." Order-maintenance arrests, such as those for vandalism or for vice economy crimes like sex work or drug possession, are characteristic of the broken windows approach. As critical scholarship on broken windows and order-maintenance policing has demonstrated, these arrests criminalize the social and economic activities of the racialized poor (Harcourt 2005; Vitale 2008; Camp and Heatherton 2016; Kohler-Hausmann 2018; Jashnani, Bustamante, and Stoudt 2020).

We found that the percentage of overall arrests classified as order-maintenance offenses was higher in gentrifying (16.63%) and non-gentrifying (19.15%) block groups than it was in non-gentrifiable block groups (14.35%). This association was confirmed by our regression analysis, which demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between gentrifying and not yet gentrifying neighborhoods and a higher incidence of order-maintenance offenses among overall arrests. The regression analysis also revealed higher rates of order-maintenance arrests in majority Black or Latinx neighborhoods. Block groups that were at least 75% Black experienced significantly higher rates of order-maintenance arrests than those that were majority white or did not have a racial majority. Likewise, our linear regression model found that in the few block groups that were 65% or more Latinx order-maintenance offenses accounted for a 5.52% greater share of total arrests than in block groups with no racial or ethnic majority.

That broken windows policing works to actively dispossess the racialized poor is apparent in the positive association we observed between real property forfeiture and a neighborhood's status as either gentrifying or not yet gentrifying. Unlike order-maintenance arrests, forfeiture is the direct participation by police in profitable dispossession along the gentrification frontier: homes seized during police investigations are sold at auction, often to developers and speculators. We found that nearly all real property forfeitures took place in gentrifying and not yet gentrifying neighborhoods. Our regression analysis confirmed this observed relationship between a neighborhood's status as gentrifying or as having the potential to gentrify and concentrations of real property forfeitures.

Broken windows policing, then, facilitates gentrification in two ways: by intensifying disinvestment in not-yet-gentrifying neighborhoods and reinforcing reinvestment in gentrifying ones. Real property forfeiture allows police and prosecutors to take advantage of disinvestment to seize distressed properties and then sell them to speculators banking on reinvestment. Their spatial distribution also shows that forfeiture responds to the intersecting geographies of race and gentrification. As with order-maintenance arrests, the linear regression showed a statistically significant relationship between majority Black or Latinx neighborhoods and higher incidence of home forfeiture.

Table 4: Arrest rates per 1,000 people for block groups addjacent to getnrification by race

	Black	White	Hisp/Lat	No Majority
Nongentrifying and not adjacent (406)	164.18 (221)	109.11 (7)	205.44 (49)	156.11 (129)
Nongentrifying and adjacent (102)	174.93 (71)	167.59 (3)	189.65 (6)	151.78 (22)
Nongentrifiable and not adjacent to gentrification (554)	82.24 (108)	62.10 (214)	55.50 (1)	76.70 (231)
Nongentrifiable and adjacent to gentrification (71)	No Block Groups	110.23 (52)	No Block Groups	150.51 (19)
Gentrifying (191)	158.61 (47)	133.96 (40)	87.83 (2)	143.03 (102)

Table 5: Percent of arrests that were categorized as order maintenance for block groups adjacent to gentrification by race (Observations)

	Black	White	Hisp/Lat	No Majority
Nongentrifying and not adjacent (406)	16.94 (221)	17.17 (7)	29.48 (49)	18.93 (129)
Nongentrifying and adjacent (102)	16.59 (71)	13.85 (3)	23.23 (6)	16.36 (22)
Nongentrifiable and not adjacent (554)	16.45 (108)	13.94 (214)	5.45 (1)	13.55 (231)
Nongentrifiable and adjacent (71)	No Block Groups	16.88 (52)	No Block Groups	11.99 (19)
Gentrifying (191)	18.31 (47)	13.34 (40)	11.11 (2)	16.93 (102)

Table 6: Forfeiture rates per 1,000 people for block groups adjacent to gentrification by race

	Black	White	Hisp/Lat	No Majority
Nongentrifying and not adjacent	2.71	0.76	3.5	1.39
Nongentrifing and adjacent	3.17	0.37	5.07	0.68
Nongentrifiable and not adjacent	0.47	0.03	0*	0.08
Nongentrifiable and adjacent	No Block Groups	0.07	No Block Groups	0.15
Gentrifying	2.93	0.28	1.15	1.41

*only one block group met this criteria

The clear relationship between a neighborhood's majority Black or Latinx status and the prevalence of broken windows policing helps us make sense of our most surprising finding: the absence of a statistically significant relationship between a block group's adjacency to gentrification and either order-maintenance arrests or real property forfeitures. Notably, this result appears to run counter to Laniyonu's finding that gentrification is indirectly associated with a higher prevalence of police stops (under New York City's Stop and Frisk program) in adjacent neighborhoods (2018). Our findings suggest that the impact of gentrification on the intensity of broken windows policing in adjacent neighborhoods is mediated by a neighborhood's racial and ethnic composition.[2] Table 4 shows the intersection between adjacency and racial composition, revealing that majority Black and Latinx block groups that are adjacent to gentrifying block groups have high arrest rates relative to non-adjacent block groups or block groups that are either white or have no racial majority. This effect is especially evident in Black block groups that are not gentrifying and yet are adjacent to gentrifying block groups. They have the highest observed arrest rate of any Black block groups. Order maintenance arrests, meanwhile, make up a consistent proportion of arrests in all Black block groups, yet the highest observed proportion occurs in gentrifying block groups (see Table 5).

It is the incidence of real property forfeiture, however, that most dramatically reveals the indirect impact of gentrification on neighboring block groups. As Table 6 shows, majority Black and Latinx block groups that are not gentrifying but are adjacent to gentrifying block groups have the highest incidence of observed forfeiture. This is true relative both to block groups that are not adjacent to gentrifying block groups and to block groups that are adjacent but are majority white or have no racial or ethnic majority. The incidence of forfeiture among non-gentrifying Black block groups adjacent to gentrifying block groups was higher than that of all other Black block groups. Latinx block groups that were not gentrifying

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[2] Our findings for adjacency are also limited by our research design. First, the linear regression was not designed to analyze the *intersecting* effects of racial composition and gentrification status on spatial patterns of policing. Second, our findings were limited by the small sample sizes involved in the adjacency analysis. For example, there were no block groups that were Black or Latinx, non-gentrifiable, and adjacent and only 6 block groups that were Latinx, non-gentrifying, and adjacent. Third, our categorical variables limited the analysis. For example, block groups that were 74% Black would be categorized as having no racial majority, while block groups that were 75% Black would be categorized as Black. Similarly, block groups that were within blocks of a gentrifying block group instead of directly adjacent to one would not be counted as adjacent. These limitations do not diminish the significance of our findings. Instead, they point to future areas of research on the relationship between gentrification, racial segregation, and policing.

yet were adjacent to gentrifying block groups had an incidence of forfeiture over five—higher than *all* other block groups. These observations are consistent with Laniyonu's emphasis on adjacency to gentrification as a driver of broken windows policing (2018). Our findings go a step further than Laniyonu's model by using real property forfeiture to reveal how police intervene directly into the built environment. Instead of revealing *who* is targeted by police, our data reveals *where* police and prosecutors participate in the management of racialized disinvestment and reinvestment through the pursuit of property forfeitures.

Qualitative Findings

Law enforcement authorities in Philadelphia routinely pursue real property forfeitures within a dramatically circumscribed geographic area of the city. Black and Latinx neighborhoods undergoing gentrification, as well as those that have experienced significant disinvestment and have the potential to gentrify, have higher rates of forfeiture than neighborhoods that are not gentrifiable. Of the 110 block groups with five or more forfeitures, 21 are gentrifying, 19 are adjacent to a gentrifying block group, and 28 are adjacent to a block group that is itself adjacent to gentrification. In other words, these 28 block groups are separated from gentrifying areas by only one block group. Thus, over 60%—a clear majority—of the block groups with the highest incidence of forfeiture are located along the "gentrification frontier." These findings confirm our expectation that broken windows policing strategies such as home forfeiture would be concentrated in areas of the city experiencing either renewed reinvestment or ongoing disinvestment.

Along this "gentrification frontier," Black and Latinx residents are most vulnerable to the financial dispossession caused by forfeiture specifically and broken windows policing more broadly. Here the terms of home ownership are shaped by entrenched racial segregation, systematic financial exclusion, real estate disinvestment, and the looming threat of potential reinvestment. Individual forfeiture cases reveal how the logic of broken windows policing transforms these political and economic conditions into grounds for seizing a building. They further reveal how, within the context of gentrification, broken windows policing gives shape to dominant conceptions about the proper comportment and responsibilities of individual property owners.

Consider the story of Michael Harrington, a Black resident of North Philadelphia who in October 2008 allegedly sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant working for narcotics police.[3] The detectives obtained a search warrant and entered his home in North Philadelphia by force. There they arrested him and seized $2,013 in cash from his person. No drugs were found on Harrington or on his property. Officers claimed to have observed Harrington engaged in other narcotics transactions, but they could not produce a positive chemical analysis of the alleged narcotics. Harrington was charged with various offenses including possession with intent to deliver and criminal conspiracy, yet in 2010 he was convicted only of possessing paraphernalia. He was sentenced to one year of probation.

Harrington's income and financial profile made him vulnerable to Philadelphia's forfeiture program. He reported that he was making $16.50 an hour as a roofer when he purchased his house in 1997. Due to a disability, however, Harrington was not working when he was arrested. Police suggested that the cash he possessed was earned through narcotics transactions. Harrington claimed that it was given to him by his son and a cousin to pay back taxes on a house his late mother had owned. Harrington's

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[3] The discussion of Harrington's story is drawn from court records accessed via a right-to-know request and viewed by Smith at the Justice Juanita Kidd Stout Center for Criminal Justice in Philadelphia and supplemented with ethnographic research and interviews that Jackson conducted in 2018 and 2019. The records for Harrington's case include trial transcripts, which are quoted from below. Harrington has been given a pseudonym to protect his privacy.

claim is quite plausible in North Philadelphia, where the racialized poor have long been excluded from mainstream financial institutions (T. E. Smith, Smith, and Wackes 2008). Alternative financial service providers, such as pawnshops and check cashing agencies, operate solely in cash, which can invite police suspicion (J. Smith 2016). Despite the plausibility of Harrington's story, his cash was seized.

Harrington's two-story red rowhouse was also uniquely vulnerable to the city's forfeiture program. It was one of just two houses still standing on its side of the street—and the other building was forfeited soon after Harrington's home. An abandoned industrial warehouse loomed across the street. The surrounding block group was over 85% Black in 2010. In 2018, nearly 40% of the Black population in that block group was living below the federal poverty line. This disinvestment, hyper-segregation, and poverty were brought about by federal and local policy discouraging public and private investment in the neighborhood.[4] The HOLC had rated it a 'hazardous' investment in 1937, in part because of an "infiltration of negro" residents (Nelson et al. n.d.).

Despite the accumulation of social and economic disadvantages faced by Harrington and his neighbors, the judge in the forfeiture case focused on the small amount of crack cocaine that Harrington was alleged to have sold. The assistant district attorney (ADA) emphasized his improper comportment as a property owner, rather than inquiring into how Harrington's alleged decision to earn income through low-level dealing might have been shaped by the disadvantageous conditions in his neighborhood. Harrington's defense attorney attempted to push back but he also worked from within a narrow understanding of what constitutes responsible homeownership. He argued that while Harrington "may not be a totally wonderful person," he had "worked as a labor union 332 [member], as a roofer, making good money, putting money into the house, taking care of it."

The defense lawyer attempted to argue for postponing a decision in the case, but the ADA objected strenuously. The ADA pointed out that her office had an auction scheduled for the coming October and argued that if Harrington's home was not forfeited that day, it would compromise her office's efficiency in unloading the property. She also insisted that, as the property owner, Harrington was "the one that is responsible for what's going on here at this property and him alone." The judge agreed, stating that it is "self-evident that illegal narcotics sales harm the surrounding community." Harrington's home was forfeited in June 2015. Facing the prospect of becoming homeless, Harrington pleaded with the judge to incarcerate him instead.

Two-and-a-half years later, after an unsuccessful appeal, the DAO sold the property for $19,250 to speculators operating under the name Learn to Live LLC, which has purchased 24 other properties at forfeiture auctions. Harrington's former home was not immediately adjacent to a gentrifying block group, but it wasn't outside the sphere of influence of encroaching reinvestment. The property's value has increased to $38,100 since Learn to Live LLC acquired it. Forfeiture, then, not only dispossesses those whose ownership of property is imperiled by ongoing racialized disinvestment, it also enriches those looking to profit on redevelopment. As it has with many of the properties it purchased at forfeiture auctions, Learn to Live runs Harrington's former home as a rental—its name evoking the sense of moral discipline and personal responsibility emphasized by PNTF attorneys.

Harrington's experience illustrates how, within the grammar of broken windows policing, disinvestment in Black and Latinx neighborhoods appears as the allegedly disordered comportment of targeted individuals. The prosecutorial unit that processes civil forfeitures conforms to this view by fixating on visible signs of perceived disorder at targeted properties. Even the unit's name, the Public

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[4] Demographic data for the neighborhoods in which forfeited properties are located is drawn from the U.S. Census and accessed via Simply Analytics.

Nuisance Task Force, represents and reinforces this perspective. During an April 2018 DAO "listening session" that [Author 1] attended in the South Philadelphia neighborhood of Point Breeze, the PNTF chief explained that the unit works to alleviate the "classic nuisances in a city environment": "drug houses," "illegal speakeasies," and houses where sex work or gambling take place. Although the PNTF initiates forfeitures in response to narcotics arrests, it often make its case by describing a building as a "public nuisance" to the surrounding neighborhood.

Much like the disorder that drives broken windows policing, nuisance is a highly subjective term through which police and prosecutors judge the complex social and political crises of racialized disinvestment. As former PNTF chief Beth Grossman put it, a public nuisance is "sort of like pornography: people know it when they see it" (Otterbein 2017). In practice, unfiltered police perceptions of social behavior at targeted properties are accepted as evidence that a building is a potentially harmful public nuisance. Many forfeiture petitions fixate on people coming and going through a building's front door, while one included a police officer's observation that an unkempt home was "not appropriate for human habitation"—an allegation that the building's owner-occupier contested when he fought for the right to remain in his home. Ascribing nuisance status not only to the built environment, but also to the bodies of Black and Latinx residents in disinvested neighborhoods, facilitates the state's efforts to target the moral comportment of homeowners and judge their fitness to own property. It is a mechanism of racial criminalization, burdening individuals with responsibility for perceived nuisance or disorder— "off-loading liability onto the bodies of the blamed," in the words of Camp and Heatherton (2016, 3).

The seizure of Harrington's home and, as a result, his freedom and independence demonstrate how the intersection between policing and financial insecurity in fact undermines human security in the city. In households where precarity is the norm, aggressive, racially motivated order-maintenance policing and high incarceration rates exacerbate household instability and financial insecurity. Residents laboring under the myriad structural factors that create household financial insecurity experience the reverberations of policing as compounding community vulnerability rather than offering security and protection. In neighborhoods undergoing gentrification, order-maintenance policing exacerbates financial insecurity, making households and whole communities more vulnerable to the displacement and dispossession of uneven urban redevelopment.

The symbiotic relationship between policing and gentrification is obvious to those targeted by police. In Grays Ferry, a majority Black neighborhood in South Philadelphia, residents recognized police as one face of a larger institutional force eager to get Black and Latinx people "out of the way" for profitable redevelopment.[5] Young men who hung out on corners referred to themselves in jest as "anti-gentrification" squads. The residents' frustrations about police were strongly informed by their knowledge of what is called "Penntrification": the aggressive development of the historically poor, Black area around the University of Pennsylvania (UoP) (see also Baldwin 2021).While UoP was expanding into Grays Ferry, immediately to its east, the City Planning office had already rebranded Grays Ferry as "Graduate City" (Clay 2017). Residents felt attacked by the forces of redevelopment and saw police as part of the invasion.

Grays Ferry residents were especially exasperated by Stop and Frisk. One focus group participant described policing in the neighborhood as "brutality, not just physical, [it's] mental and emotional [too]." This emotional toll was intensified as residents' sense of belonging was compromised by the knowledge that their neighborhood was targeted for redevelopment. In this circumstance, they could not possibly see the police as working to better their lives or their community. During a focus group conversation

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[5] All quotes are from a focus group Vanessa ran on April 9, 2016.

about the role of police in Grays Ferry, two men discussed how they therefore sought to protect one another during arrests:

> Man 1: These cops don't care about us at all… there's not feelings and emotions with these police officers for our community at all… [referencing a rapidly gentrifying section the neighborhood] we can't even walk in our neighborhoods sometimes without police being called on us, ya know what I mean, so this is crazy.

> Facilitator: For the women in the group, do you have similar sentiments towards the police force?

> Man 2: (gestures toward his mother) She watched me get pulled over before, my whole family recording, and [the officer who stopped me] told my mom to go back in the house; as if she's not my protector. Like as far as, I'm in your guys' hands now, she the only eye witness and they told her to go back in the house, for what reason? It supposed to be a traffic stop…

> Man 1: If you don't fight for yourself they will run over you… the police here don't have no understanding of their job.

These participants saw themselves as working together against the police, who they regarded as working for institutional and university-connected forces seeking to make their neighborhood more attractive to outsiders like students, wealthy suburbanites, or tourists.

Grays Ferry residents experienced the financial toll of policing and incarceration as a corollary to the city's interest in profitably redeveloping their neighborhood. One man called Vanessa's attention to the price-gouging of corporations who contract with the state to provide services in prisons. He suggested that police may also benefit from arrests, stating that "the more people they lock up the more money they get; so they don't care, even though they might have been doing wrong—that was the [financial] support [in a family]—[police] don't care about that." Another resident echoed his concerns about the financial strain of prison and its apparent benefit to financial and political elites: "they lock everybody up because they feel as though they need to make that quota…now it costs [us] more to go to court, […] get a lawyer, [and] commissary." Grays Ferry residents experienced the carceral state as expropriating the community's social and financial assets. As another resident explained:

> There's a lot of [our] money being spent in the prison… That's why a lot of mothers are struggling because they're trying to take care of their fathers or their brothers or their cousins or even their baby fathers or husbands… I did ten years in prison almost and a lot of guys that were married was innocent and their families went down in the gutter… The cops was just [targeting] men in the community… they use that badge to feel like they are doing something good.

While incarceration is a massive public expenditure, incarcerated residents of Grays Ferry understood that contracted corporations could extract profit from it by passing the financial burden on to their families.

Incarcerated residents and their families understood intimately that policing leads to incarceration and that incarceration is a significant household burden (Massaro 2020). Nearly 20% of respondents to Vanessa's household survey had recently added money to an incarcerated person's commissary account with an average payment of $269 per month. In addition, 36.9% of survey respondents reported having paid a citation or ticket in the preceding year. These respondents paid, on average, $140 a year in citations. The high number of respondents struggling with these burdens reveals the strain placed on the social and economic fabric of Black and Latinx neighborhoods by geographic concentrations of broken windows policing.

The stark differences between policing practices in gentrifying and non-gentrifying neighborhoods versus those that are non-gentrifiable causes a financial strain that compounds low-income residents' vulnerability to displacement. Residents bearing the household costs of policing and incarceration, for example, may feel greater pressure to accept developers' aggressive offers to purchase their homes (Adelman and McCoy 2019). The spatiality of policing makes poor households poorer. This fact was clear in Grays Ferry:

> There is no good coming in to South Philly [from] them building… And who it's gonna benefit? It's gonna benefit them, not us. And we left right back in the same cycle, but when we start takin' things, then we the criminals. But they taking things legally, they're not criminals… it makes no sense.

Indeed, many Grays Ferry residents live the relationship between police, gentrification, and dispossession that our regression analysis revealed. Their vulnerability to the forces of dispossession and displacement is routinely compounded by encounters with police and the criminal justice system. Throughout the "gentrifiable" neighborhoods of Philadelphia, police stops and arrests are directly responsible for significant household financial costs incurred by residents across the community—not just by those who are arrested or incarcerated. These costs exacerbate residents' vulnerability to displacement via gentrification. And such costly encounters with police and the criminal justice system assure community residents that gentrification is not for them.

Conclusion

Our mixed-methods analysis of the relationship between broken windows policing and gentrification in Philadelphia reveals that neighborhoods along the "gentrification frontier" suffer more arrests, more forfeitures, and a greater reliance on order-maintenance approaches to policing. Our linear regression (Table 3) shows that if we hold demographic variability across the city constant, gentrification status is consistently associated with more intensive policing practices. While race and ethnicity did not have a similarly consistent effect across our measures of policing, their impact is clear when we consider how the interaction of race and gentrification influences policing. The highest rates of arrest and forfeiture that we observed, as well as the highest percentage of arrests that could be classified as order-maintenance, occurred in majority Black or Latinx neighborhoods with specific relationships to gentrification. And as Tables 4, 5, and A1 show, neighborhoods that are largely Black and that are situated adjacent to gentrifying areas experience more intensive policing than either Black neighborhoods far from gentrifying areas or white and racially heterogeneous neighborhoods of any gentrification status. Meanwhile, proximity to gentrification in non-gentrifying Latinx neighborhoods—all of which are gentrifiable due to ongoing disinvestment and most of which are within a few block groups of gentrifying neighborhoods—translated to the highest observed rates of forfeiture for our entire study.

These findings suggest that Black and Latinx Philadelphians living amid gentrification are doubly vulnerable to dispossession, both by the speculators and by police and prosecutors. Home forfeiture exemplifies this double vulnerability; it unifies police and speculators into a single urban policy. The DAO's commitment to forfeiture thus stands in stark contrast to residents' expectations that the city will protect them from predatory urban redevelopment. After the chief of the PNTF discussed nuisance properties at the DAO "listening session" in Point Breeze, an audience composed mostly of middle-aged Black women pushed back by expressing their expectation of the DAO's responsibility. They demanded to know what the office was doing about deed theft (i.e. the theft of homes through the filing of fraudulent deed transfers). One woman said:

> You talk about crime. If people don't have anywhere to live, there is gonna be crime…

so you're not gonna stop crime, if they don't have anywhere to live. Most people here in South Philadelphia and all over the city of Philadelphia are… victims of being put out of their homes… that is crime.

DAO officials initially dismissed her complaint by suggesting that the office does not deal with issues such as gentrification. She persisted, however, saying "it's fraud when you're stealing homes." Several other women stood up to echo her concerns until First Assistant District Attorney Robert Listenbee asked for a show of hands of those who knew somebody whose home had been stolen. He was stunned to see nearly every hand in the audience raised. Indeed, deed theft is a rampant problem in Philadelphia where rates of Black homeownership, which have historically has been higher than in many other American cities, are now declining precipitously (N.A. 2013; Bowen-Gaddy 2018). After the issue was raised, a representative of a legal aid service said that she had repeatedly tried to bring the issue to the attention of the DAO only to be told "it's a civil issue" rather than a prosecutable crime. Yet while refusing to initiate civil litigation to deal with deed theft, the DAO had been operating a busy civil unit tasked with seizing the homes of individuals touched by the drug economy. These women understood the state to have acted as a partner to speculators instead of working to protect Black and Latinx Philadelphians from displacement and dispossession.

Police and criminal justice actors purport to manage the social harms of disinvestment by using broken windows policing campaigns to target perceived signs of disorder, but as the focus group reveals, residents of disinvested and redeveloping neighborhoods experience these efforts as racialized assaults on their behavior. The ordeal which Harrington endured clearly reveals the racializing effects of intensive policing along the "gentrification frontier". After he was stripped of his home, speculative developers took advantage by purchasing it at auction—just as they have done with hundreds of other homes seized by police along the "gentrification frontier." This transfer of wealth from Black and Latinx residents to developers and speculators contradicts the DAO's public pronouncements that forfeiture remediates harm caused to neighborhoods by the drug trade (Williams 2015). As the speculator Toby Biddle observed, the forfeiture program was "about the money… not about neighborhood improvement. That's just a good by-product that they hope for." In fact, many forfeited properties end up in the hands of LLCs, which either rehabilitate them for higher-income consumers or add them to the large stock of substandard rental housing managed by predatory LLCs in poor and racially marginalized neighborhoods (Walker 2019).

Our analysis ultimately reveals the complex dialectical and synergistic relationship between racialized policing and uneven development, illuminating one pathway through which—as Anne Bonds recently put it in a call for scholars to explore the "linkages between property, race, and the carceral state"—the "politics of residential property… [are] fundamentally connected to practices of policing and the carceral management of urban space" (Bonds 2018). The punitive dispossession of homeowners like Harrington through forfeiture benefits those betting on the city's shifting boundaries of race and class (Briggs 2016). Meanwhile, the high household costs of policing and incarceration—which are concentrated in neighborhoods with the lowest incomes and on the cusp of gentrification—compound poor Philadelphians' vulnerability to dispossession and displacement in the service of gentrification.

These findings suggest that scholars of racialized policing should continue to scrutinize the relationship between the spatial patterns of policing, geographies of financial exclusion, and the profitability of dispossession.

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Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures

Table A1: Summary data by demographic independent variables
A1.1 Race Categorical Variable

	BLACK	HISPLAT	WHITE	NO MAJORITY
Total Block Groups	447	58	316	503
Total Arrests (2013)	64158	13385	29512	73623
Total Real Property Forfeitures (1994 - 2017)	990	235	30	441
Total Population (2013)	445926	67221	376461	636827
Arrests per 1000 residents (2013)	143.88	199.12	78.39	115.61
Percent of arrests classified as "Order Maintenance" (2013)	16.96	28.77	14.56	16.21
Real property forfeitures per 1000 (1994 - 2017)	2.22	3.50	0.08	0.69

Table A1.2 Educational Attainment Categorical Variable

	ABOVE AVG EDU RATE	BELOW AVG EDU RATE	MID RANGE EDU RATE
Total Block Groups	331	328	665
Total Arrests (2013)	36738	57581	86368
Total Real Property Forfeitures (1994 - 2017)	88	906	702
Total Population (2013)	388898	356884	780653
Arrests per 1000 residents (2013)	94.47	161.34	110.64
Percent of arrests classified as "Order Maintenance" (2013)	14.20	20.07	16.43
Real property forfeitures per 1000 (1994 - 2017)	0.23	2.54	0.90

Table A1.3 Income Categorical Variable

	HIGH INCOME	LOW INCOME	MID RANGE INCOME
Total Block Groups	406	328	590
Total Arrests (2013)	40760	60435	79492
Total Real Property Forfeitures (1994 - 2017)	64	915	717
Total Population (2013)	508849	339877	677709
Arrests per 1000 residents (2013)	80.10	177.81	117.30
Percent of arrests classified as "Order Maintenance" (2013)	14.35	20.05	16.35
Real property forfeitures per 1000 (1994 - 2017)	0.13	2.69	1.06

A1.4 Vacancy Categorical Variable

	Average Vacancy Rate	High Vacancy Rate	Low Vacancy Rate
Total Block Groups	332	330	662
Total Arrests (2013)	50874	57114	72699
Total Real Property Forfeitures (1994 - 2017)	510	848	338
Total Population (2013)	381283	291663	853489
Arrests per 1000 residents (2013)	133.43	195.82	85.18
Percent of arrests classified as "Order Maintenance" (2013)	17.30	17.99	16.36
Real property forfeitures per 1000 (1994 - 2017)	1.34	2.91	0.40