Charting the Territory:  
Space and Power in the Iraq War

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Abstract

I analyze the 2007 mapping and walling of Baghdad’s neighborhoods into ‘gated communities’ and ‘ghettos’ as a way of distinguishing and segregating Sunni and Shia ‘friends and ‘foes’. This walling was part of the Iraq War (2003-2010) in which a US-led military coalition invaded the state and framed its occupation as a project aimed to reconstruct Iraq into a modern democratic state. I situate this walling project within Foucault’s notion of gridding space, and argue that it exemplifies the materialization of the cell technique, and Carl Schmitt’s articulation of three modes of empty space in relation to territory. I argue that the walling process was an attempt to produce what I call “continuous security”, predicated upon the assumption of a population’s characterized belonging to the circumnavigated territory. On the outskirts of the walls, however, the security measures remained to be discontinuous – risk here was high as the space was inhabited by a heterogeneous milieu. The outskirts, on the other hand, can be articulated as spaces of discontinuous security where “place-based” global sovereignty and uneven networks of places have come to characterize population. The imposition of the disciplinary mechanism of walling was met with resistance and had a disastrous impact on the life of Baghdad’s residents, as shown by Haifa Zagnana (2010) and soon was abandoned both by the US military and by the Iraqi government of that time.

Keywords

Walling; mapping; Iraq; war security

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Introduction

BAGHDAD – The U.S. military is walling off at least 10 of Baghdad's most violent neighborhoods and using biometric technology to track some of their residents, creating what officers call "gated communities" in an attempt to carve out oases of safety in this war-ravaged city.

Karin Brulliard “‘Gated Communities' For the War-Ravaged” (April 23, 2007)

… both expulsion and containment are mechanisms for the very drawing of [the] line.

Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak Who Sings the Nation State (2007: 34)

On March 17, 2003, George W. Bush in a public address known as the “48 Hours” speech constructed the upcoming invasion of Iraq as a liberation effort that would provide security not only for the United States but also for the world as a whole. Conceived as a security measure in response to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, it was assumed that this invasion would remove Saddam Hussein from power and bring democracy and safety to Iraq so that the state would not pose a threat to the United States. Former president Bush promised the Iraqi people the opportunity to build a “vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.” This nation-state building process could begin only after a military campaign disposed of the “lawless men who rule [Iraq].” Less than two months later, on May 1, 2003, Bush addressed the American public from the deck of USS Abraham Lincoln, announcing that “[m]ajor combat operations in Iraq have ended.” The military campaign in Iraq transitioned from war to state-building: “now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.” While May 1, 2003 marks the end of the official War on Iraq, May 12, 2003 signals the beginning of the American military state-building mission in Iraq. This mission was directed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, headed by Paul Bremer, former Chairman for the National Commission on Terrorism, who arrived in Baghdad on May 12, 2003 with “broad mandate and plenary powers.” The invasion became a seven-year state-building project, as it was not until 2010 that President Barak Obama declared the Iraq War officially over.

Mapping and walling have been instrumental in establishing spaces of everyday life as zones of immobility – the prison, as an institution, emblematically embodies this primary structure of enclosing, which played a crucial role in the U.S. reconstruction of Iraq in the Iraq War (2003-2010). In April 2007, the U.S. military walled off eleven of Baghdad’s neighborhoods with 10-feet concrete walls. These "gated communities" were to “carve out oases of safety in this war-ravaged city” (Brulliard 2007). This walling, combined with checkpoints and barricades, amounted to close to 1,400 walling units throughout the city. This article analyzes the mapping and subsequent walling in Baghdad in relation to the ongoing securitization – the process of distinguishing and segregating –, a question Carl Schmitt has framed in terms of friends and foes (2007).

In this article, I argue that the mapping and walling in the context of the 2003-2010 Iraq war are exemplary of Foucault’s notion of a gridded space (Foucault 1975: 148). They function as a disciplinary mechanism and more specifically as instances of spacing produced through what Foucault termed the cell technique. Whereas mapping structured the imaginary parameters of sovereignty, walling attempted to materialize them through concrete infrastructure. The overlay of mapping with walling illuminates the inability of the apparatus of security to shore up a state, whose population and territory remained within the imaginary of the largely unknown and threatening “Oriental other”. Instead, the known and the safe were attempted through disciplinary techniques. Walling was to provide an external and internal boundary to the city, and to barricade and harness within this limit the liminal empty space of the in-between: the in-between the wall and the city houses and the in-between the wall and the rest of the city. Concrete walls, however, failed to produce concrete identities by cementing individuals to a territory. Rather, they became beacons of insecurity and instability. The article focuses this connection between visualization and sovereignty in order to question the use of territorial habitation, in other words, the idea that populations are anchored to territories as an identifying marker.

The mapping and walling of corridors of movement or detention have historically been connected to notions of sovereignty and thus security. Both the symbolic and physical charting of territory are instrumental visualization security techniques that play key roles in the articulation of state power. Fortification as political walling has long delimited the ins and outs of tribal areas, national territory, as well as city grounds. In the context of the American state-building

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Edward Said has argued that under the rubric of “Orientalism,” Western imperialism has conceived of the imaginary geography of the Orient as a place removed spatially and temporally from the modern present – hence lingering in backwards temporalities and lurking beyond the horizon of the rational West. This rubric has in turn authorized discourses of power and knowledge that demonstrate the superiority, and thus the justified mastery, of the Western world. See Said, 1978.
project in Iraq, the territory became reconfigured into cellular terrain through the
mapping and subsequent physical walling reconstruction of sub-state spaces as
seen in the Iraq’s Green Zone – the infamous walled off-site of the U.S.
administration, the town of Fallujah, the “gated communities” of Baghdad.
Mapping and walling exemplify and amplify the relevance of Foucault’s argument
about the importance of the cellular technique to the articulation of power. They
further demonstrate that the key feature of the gridded space is its visuality: the
ability to be imagined and seen as a space divided in order to be then constructed
and experienced as disciplined space of segregation.

In distinguishing between the conceptual evocation of space, territory, and
terrain in the Iraq War, I turn to the work of Stuart Elden. He defines space as “a
particular dimension of the material world that arises in the scientific revolution of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, understood as calculated and measurable,
extended in three dimensions” (2009: xxvi). He conveys territory as “a political and
legal term concerning the relationship between sovereignty, land, and people”
(ibid.). Terrain comes to designate features of the land such as “mountains, deserts,
or arctic regions” (ibid.) Whereas the concept of terrain lacks accountability of
population, the territory insists on factoring habitation in the project of
securitization. Whereas population and territory have traditionally been associated
with the sovereignty of the nation-state, the example of this case study speaks to a
subnational operation of power as the unit articulated here became the
neighborhood rather than the state or the city-state. Elden’s argument is adapted
here on a micro level to argue that the walling within Baghdad evokes ideas of
territory formerly associated with nation-building in the context of a city. The city
was to be divided into multiple territories, each featuring fixed homogeneous
population and thus more easily definable sovereignty.

In the context of Iraq, I argue that both disciplinary and security measures
were deployed at subnational levels, transforming the nation-state, the city and the
neighborhood both into an empty terrain and risk-management territory. The
disciplinary mechanism of militarized state-building ushered the territorial
rebuilding of Iraq in the context of the empty terrain of a failed state – a state under
the Hobbesian condition of “state of nature” (Hobbes, 1987). Such measures
attempted to parcel out the city of Baghdad into homogeneous walled-off gated
communities. They subject space to what I call “continuous security”. This
continuous security is predicated upon the confirmation of a population as being
characterized through a belonging to the circumnavigated territory. The continuous
logic has historically been associated with the fortification efforts of the space of
the nation-state and thus “space-based” state sovereignty. On the outskirts of the
walls, however, the security measures in place remained to be discontinuous – risk
here remained high as the space was inhabited by a heterogeneous milieu. The
outskirts of the wall and the line, on the other hand, can be articulated as spaces of
discontinuous security, in which what Foucault termed “security” rather than
“disciplinary” apparatus based on risk operates (Foucault, 2004). Discontinuous
security describes “place-based” global sovereignty in which uneven networks of places have come to characterize population.

Understood as pixels, data-cells, empty boxes, or walled-off physical space, the territories of Iraq/Baghdad/Adhamiya were inscribed in the continuous securitization visualization logic of the cell technique – “a disciplinary technique of putting someone in a cell” (Foucault 1975: 148). Cell techniques underpin the “transform the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities,” thus facilitating the distribution, analysis, and control of the bodies structured by its cells (ibid.). The organization of space is thus a process of organizing bodies on the premise that territory is an intrinsic characteristic of the body. In other words, friends and foes in the context of the disciplinary mechanism, and more specifically in the historical context of Iraq, have been “divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified” on the basis of their territorial habitation and territorial (re)positioning (Foucault 1969: 42). Territorial habitation alongside with biometric identification became barometers of the security of the state.

The mapping and walling of borders have demonstrated the ability to articulate a relationship between a population and a territory. As Reece Jones writes that “the state needs to be able to see the people, the land, and the resources in its territory in a legible or namable way; they must be quantifiable and situate in a known, locatable place” (2016: 78). John Pickles has located the “drawing and interpreting of a line” as the primary marker of the cartographic impulse and imagination (2004: 9). While Judith Butler has further theorized that “[t]he line comes to exist politically at the moment in which someone passes or is refused right of passage” (2007: 34). The line –and its actualization as a wall– then becomes iconic of the act of refusal of mobility, presently biometrically managed and enforced with both physical and virtual military presence. The mapping and subsequent walling of Baghdad during the Iraq War are thus prime examples of the implementation of the logic of the grid in order to demonstrate the presence of an effective American sovereignty.

Mapping the Territory

Pickles has illustrated in depth the ways in which maps are “essential tools in territorializing the state by extending systems of policing and administration, and in establishing a sense of national identity at home and abroad” in the process of the construction of nation-states (2004: 39). The mapping and walling of Baghdad should be situated within the larger historical context of what Jordan Branch has termed the emergence of the “cartographic state”. The cartographic state, which comes to fruition in the early 19th century Europe, relies on exclusive territorial authority and discrete boundaries (Branch 2014: 8-9). This particular political organization, according to Branch, is driven largely in part by the development and production of mapping enterprises that structure territory as “homogeneous and geometrically divisible” surface (ibid.). Conceptions of homogeneous territory produced through mapping have given rise to a “modern notion of boundary-
defined political spaces” (Ibid.: 21). The national territory is no longer a collection of unique places, but rather empty thus scalable and conquerable space. As this case study shows, the city and the neighborhood are envisioned similarly into homogenous scalable spaces. The modern conception of territory as homogeneous space, which as Branch argues has carried over to today’s digital cartographic efforts, is predicated upon the adoption of modern cartography of the Ptolemaic principles. Developed by Claudius Ptolemy in the 2nd century AD on the principle of a celestial grid, it became popularized during the Renaissance and is upheld into digital mapping. Modern mapping, thus both analog and digital has historically on the institution of a gridding mechanism. It functions thus as a disciplinary mechanism and is exemplary of the cell technique. The reduction of historical place into historical space reinforces the primacy of both homogeneous and emptiness in the upholding of territory-bound sovereignty.

Visual spatial emptiness depends upon the erasure of population. The geometry of the map that produces homogeneous empty space is only possible through the removal of the mark of human habitation. Territory is revealed as a stable entity, which can be enclosed within the line and the wall only when stripped by its inhabitants. Population becomes a property of territory for the cartographic state: a property that fluctuates thus and must be clearly discerned and permanently fixed. In a cartographic state, sovereignty is derived from the administration of territory, and therefore population. The imaginary, imaged, and instituted segregation of the eleven Baghdad neighborhoods constitutes precisely an instance of “territorial cleansing” (Egbert et al 2016). The desired ethnic purity associated with a particular territory here was articulated through the political trope of emptiness.

The Evocation of the Empty Land with regards to The War on Terror

In the context of the United States, emptiness has been theorized by Richard Slotkin (2001) in his analysis of the myth of the frontier and more recently by Donald Pease (2007) in his discussion of the trope of the virgin land (a land untouched by foreign attacks up until the 9/11 attacks). Writing shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Slotkin observed that the war on terror had deployed two myths for its rationalization: that of the “savage war” and that of the “frontier.” Pease, building upon Slotkin's work, traces the trope of the “virgin land” in the pre-9/11 mythology and its replacement with “ground zero” and “homeland” in Bush's presidential rhetoric, connecting the trope of emptiness with innocence rather than civility. He argues that “the state of emergency Bush erected at Ground Zero was thereafter endowed with the responsibility to defend the homeland because of foreign violations of the virgin land had alienated the national people from their imaginary way of inhabiting the nation (Pease 2007: 62).” This virgin land, moreover, was imagined as “wounded” - harking back to the imaginary of a benevolent militarized state-building as “healing” as opposed to terrorism, which in turn is “wounding” (Ibid.: 63).
The road from liberation to reconstruction in Iraq was heavily reliant on the trope of empty or emptied land, understood again in the first interpretation offered by Schmitt, namely as a lack of sovereignty. With the institution of the “ground zero” as the dominant rallying point of the Bush administration, I argue of that the trope of the “virgin” land was replaced with that of the empty land. Here emptiness is evoked in the Hobbesian and Schmittian terms as a “depopulated ... landscape in the imaginary register so that it might be perceived as an unoccupied territory in actuality” to the nation-states of Afghanistan and Iraq (Pease 2007: 63).

Carl Schmitt's theoretical framework provides a productive context for understanding the reliance of state-building in Western political thought on emptied spatial formations. The figuration of empty space is also an important element of Schmitt's description of the 15th-century European imperial expansion – where the new world was not an enemy, but rather an 'emptied space', an ordering I suggest, was seen as being in need of purification for the purpose of creating homogeneous population through violence before state-building can begin anew. This process is reliant upon the removal of the state sovereignty. Emptied of sovereign power, the state becomes a territory to be secured through the purification and homogenization of its inhabitants. It is indeed this emptiness that allows a state to become a territory in order to again emerge a state, and a people to be reduced to a population in order to be established as “a People.”

The political premise of emptiness was legitimized through the cartographic spatial visualization techniques of the grid as it requires emptiness in order to make spacing and thus discipline possible. Disciplinary power thus is reliant upon the visualization and actualization of emptiness. More specifically, the discipline of population depends on the constitution of territory as empty terrain onto which multitude can be monitored, cataloged, relocated. This logic of emptiness was applied to Iraq not only on national but also subnational levels through the active visualization of the desert as empty space through overhead imagery as well as through the active mapping and physical reconstruction of the cities.

**Imaging the Territory**

The coupling of airpower with aerial imagery of territory has been theorized in the context of the Iraq War by Lisa Parks (2013), who has written extensively on the power of satellite and “overhead” images in both visualizing as well as surveillance technologies. She defines the latter as “image-data that has been acquired by instruments onboard aircraft or satellites, downlinked to earth stations, rendered by computer software, and in some cases, composited for the purpose of representing, viewing, and analyzing particular sites or activities on earth” (2013):

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5 See Giorgio Agamben’s influential essay “What is a People” (2000).
Overhead imagery, now connected to satellites, airplanes, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles, allows both for surveillance as well as the constant possibility of an aerial attack.

In the digital context, however, this type of representation of the territory (both still and moving imagery), functions as Parks argues as “image-data:” as the accumulation of coordinates that can be layered with other forms of data, updated constantly, dynamically scaled, and reconfigured. Images as data rendered territory and mapping as both visual as well as an algorithmic entity. The knowledge produced is thus both visual as well as computational: the grid of the analog map becomes subsumed in the grid of the digital pixel. The quantification of territory provided another reassurance of mastery, given the region’s seeming defiance of empirical inquiry (Parks 2013: 197).

As overhead imagery became recordable and shareable through photography, videography, and cartography, the “imagined omniscience” that Priya Satia (2014) argues aircraft warranted was transferred to a much wider audience of users both explicitly as well as implicitly entrenched in war. Both the aerial and the overhead image disseminated through virtual environments, gaming, Google Earth, and other commercial as well as popular digital environments, propagated an idea of the seemingly barren and flat territory of Iraq as cartographies of emptiness. Here the populations that inhabit the terrain are rendered invisible, and what is left is the geometric, abstract rendition of war that as Derek Gregory shows, produces extreme optical detachment and articulates cities as city-as-target (2013:183). Hence the territory of the city, as well as that of the desert, were subjected to both the logics of abstraction and detachment as they were articulated as geometries and algorithms to be surveyed and targeted. Furthermore, as Gregory writes, both the “American air operations reduced Iraqi cities not only to strings of coordinates but also to constellations of pixels on a visual display, [and the] ground operations [which] reduced them to three-dimensional object-spaces of buildings and physical network” follow the same visualization logic of skeletal geometry emptied out of people (Ibid: 182-4). This gridding disciplinary technique of the overhead imagery is a demonstration of understanding territory and terrain as data-driven “grids of specification” (Foucault 1969: 42). Thus, the emptied space of the city is reduced to geometric data that once entered into a database can be studied, reconfigured, and exported.

The visual regimes of imagined omniscience and optical detachment achieved through the distillation of territory into emptied terrain are thus foundational for the legitimation of the logic of militarized state-building. They establish an assurance of mastery first by reducing the territory to an empty terrain, and second, reducing the terrain to a series of geometric formations that can be then integrated into a cellular logic. Both the abstraction of homes into rectangular dwellings as well as their reduction into pixels of data institute disciplinary power via the mechanism of the grid.
Extending Parks, Gregory, and Branch’s arguments, I argue that in the coupling of overhead imagery with traditional cartography, the logic of the grid is doubled, reinforced. First, through the use of the traditional cartographic Ptolemy grid, and second, of the photographic view of the algorithmic city. This argument is made visible in the case of Baghdad’s neighborhoods, as seen in Figure 1, where a perceptual double reassurance of the homogeneity and emptiness of the space to be disciplined are constructed: one derived from cartography, the other, from photography.

**From Line to Wall**

The use of overhead surveillance and targeting, and furthermore of overhead imagery directly impacted the reconstruction of a physically emptied and a symbolically perceived as empty Iraq. They were crucial components not only in the control of a supposedly subversive population in a flat and featureless urban and rural territories, but also in the material reconstruction of the nation-state. Aerial imagery was thus the basis for both projects: the representation and the physical redistribution of the Iraqi population. This investment in aerial imagery, with its logics of cellurization and emptiness, is evident in the rise of “gated communities” through the major Iraqi cities. During 2007 and 2008, Iraq was subjected to significant walling and enclave efforts coupled with increased drone surveillance and targeting (Niva 2008).

During the Iraq War, the US Military was involved in a long-standing mapping project that attempted to articulate territory as ethnically fixed and thus to anchor ethnicity to a stable spatial parameter. As Haifa Zangana writes “[a] new map of Iraq coloured in red (Sunnis), green (Shia’s) and yellow (Christians), indicating the newly manufactured reality of how Iraq and Iraqis should be, has often been used by the US military in their press briefing to the media and consequently referred to by the media and international organization, mostly, without questioning helping to establish a forged reality” (2010: 45). This mapping system was produced under the guidance of the US military and reflected the percentage of ethnic groups occupying 200 Baghdadi neighborhoods even though most of the population of the city is of mixed religious and ethnic background (2010: 46). The mapping justified the virtual and physical reconstruction of Baghdad by insisting on identifying and separating its multi-ethnic and multi-faith population.

The materialization of the idea of the border through the translation of the cartographic line into the physicality of the wall is captured by a satellite map of Adhamiya, posted on the Healing Iraq blog (Fig. 1). The map presents the neighborhood as a geometric collage – an abstract space. The scale of vision produced by the birds-eye view obscures the presence of the residents, that is, people are de facto not represented on this map. The emptied homogeneous space of the city is then marked with a thin red solid/dashed line. The line was to show the confirmed and possible routes of the concrete wall that would soon separate the
Sunni residents of Adhamiya from their Shia neighbors. This attempt to partition and catalog the population into discrete units based on cultural affiliation was conditioned by a “cultural re-turn” policy in the US military, in which cultural understanding was seen as a necessary component of the success of the Iraqi mission, as Derek Gregory has argued (2013: 186-7). This turn, however, was soon to be abandoned in favor of computer-driven algorithmic biometric technology.

Starting in April 2007, the U.S. military walled off eleven of Baghdad’s neighborhoods with 10-feet concrete walls (Fig. 2). These “gated communities” were to “carve out oases of safety in this war-ravaged city” (Brulliard 2007). The walling was meant to divide Sunni from Shia’ Iraqis and thus to reduce ethnic violence. This moment of introduction of sub-city walling coincided with the adoption of biometric technology —which in 2008 would become the predominant paradigm of population control, and the rise of the use of aerial power. As Haifa Zagnana reported, “[e]very wall has one entry checkpoint, and one exit, boxing closely linked communities into ghettos and gated communities” (2010: 42). The introduction of sub-city walls was seen as problematic both by the Iraqi leadership as well as by the local residents. Iraq’s premier Nouri al-Maliki called for a halt to this construction (Glaister 2007). Meanwhile, residents expressed concerns that ethnic tensions would only increase and compared life in these communities to “an open prison, where the guards (the Sahwa) are the same people who terrorized the district before they swapped their allegiance to the U.S.-backed networks (Howard 2008). As Zagnana has argued, the walls proved to be especially destructive for the women of Baghdad, who for security reasons had taken on most of the basic functions necessary for daily survival – such as grocery shopping, escorting children to school, as well most bureaucratic functions such as paying bills and negotiating contracts.

The compartmentalization of space through mapping and walling was seen as a necessary divisive instrument that will visually as well as physically segregates population into supposedly homogeneous groups. Using walls as barricades, the U.S. Military broke down the city into smaller units, and after a few months of practice in diving, cataloging, and policing sectarian divisions, was ready to scale its operation to include complete towns, as seen in the case of Fallujah. In August 2007, in order to identify insurgents and secure the region, almost all of the 250,000 residents of Fallujah were evacuated or displaced and only the once biometrically enrolled were let back in (Muller 2010). Here the goal was to identify all members of the town and to deny access to anyone who was perceived as not belonging or as posing a threat. Extensive mapping alongside ethnic lines on the basis of overhead imagery and on-the-ground biometric scanning reinforced the physical partition that transformed the city into “a maze”.

Walling as Disciplinary Mechanism

The “gated communities” and ghettos of Bagdad are exemplary of the cell disciplinary techniques deployed by the American forces in the Iraq War. As Zagnana has illustrated, the walling of the city “disrupted daily life emptying the streets … and displacing about a quarter of the population” (2010: 42). They articulate the emptying of space and its subsequent construction and organization. Emptied space is sectioned off so that populations, seen as intrinsic to territory, can be cataloged and redistributed. More specifically, physical space is subdivided into visible, distinguishable and supposedly impenetrable cells. “Gated communities” in Iraq thus more specifically exemplify what Foucault terms “cell technique” and thus harken symbolically as well as politically to the institution of the prison (2004: 8). In other words, the “gated communities” here figure as prisons, as territories occupied, charted, surveyed, and secured through force. They are premised however on a historical practice of remote visualization and policing made possible by both the act of walling and surveillance delivered through manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Gated Communities/Ghettos

The term “gated community” presents a paradox: by emphasizing the ‘gate’ or the porous point of exit and entry, it obscures the infrastructure of the wall – the impenetrable barrier that physically and mentally separates those who are in from those who are out. It is important to note that both the wall and the gate are mechanisms of exclusion and segregation that operate through their visual presence. As Edward Blakey and Mary Gail Snyder demonstrate “[g]ates are visible signs of exclusion, an even stronger signal to those who already see themselves as excluded from the larger mainstream of the social milieu” (1997: 152). Walls, on the other hand, both wall in and wall out by blurring the line between protection and imprisonment. The walls of Baghdad were presented to the public to be barricades – “walls for protection, cohesion, and solidarity” (Marcuse 1995: 248). But they were, in fact, functioning as prison walls – “walls defining ghettos and places of confinement, walls built for control and re-education of those forced to live behind them” (ibid.). As such, they differ from the walls of the Green Zone –which function as “stockades” and share with the walls that separate the West Bank and Gaza from Israel the characteristics of being “walls of aggression” and superiority, both “protecting pioneers and securing their invasion” (ibid.).

The walls within Bagdad visualized the export of domestic policies of separation and segregation that have long characterized the modern as well as postmodern states and cities as the dominant matrix for the reconstruction of the Oriental city into a modern one. The practice of walling the gated community as well as the public housing project/the ghetto should be situated within a larger framework of an architecture of fear from a foe where the wall and the gate are both meant to separate and thus segregate. In the context of the United States though, gated communities have historically been associated with prestige and
protection for those racially white and economically wealthy, while ghettoes deployed walling under the condition of the prison. Blakey and Snyder write that the US gated communities exemplify a “fortress mentality:” “[t]hose who feel threatened by poverty and color-creep have two options: to fort up in place or to move to a perceived safe zone and fortify themselves there” (Ibid:50). In the gated community, the wall keeps the enemy out, while in the ghetto – it binds the enemy in.

The architectures of the ghetto and the gated community exemplify the homogenizing tendency of the modern state. In the context of the United States, this tendency is rooted in what David Theo Goldberg has termed the racial logic of the state. In his seminal book, *The Racial State*, he writes that “[t]he racial state, the state’s definition in racial terms, thus becomes the racial characterization of the apparatus, the projects, the institutions for managing this threat [of heterogeneity]” (2002: 34). Race becomes the mechanism for managing “otherness” (Ibid: 23). The relationship between race and nation here is articulated through the notion of both articulating difference and then enacting belonging based on this difference.

The racial logic that has historically structured the social fabric of the United States is carried over to the remaking of Iraq first via the articulation of the “Green Zone” – an enclave for American and other Western military and civil administrators of Iraq and second via the translation of the “Green Zone” logic to the gating for Iraqi neighborhoods such as Adhamiya. As such, “gated communities” of Iraq have been seen as an extension of Israel’s policy of occupying and segregating through the walling of the West Bank and Gaza (Niva 2008).

The protection of a gated community in America has been willing rather than willed (Blakey and Snyder 1997: 148). In other words, the fortification of white and wealthy residents into gated communities has been a voluntary action, whereas the fortification of friendlier to the US ethnic Iraqi groups has been an act of forced division and segregation into “safe” gated communities. This enforcement of safety makes the “gated communities” of Baghdad more akin to the public housing projects in the United States and the architecture of the prison. As Niva writes, the walls in Iraq formalized the “ethnic break up of Iraq” by “bolstered sectarianism, isolating Iraqis from their neighbors and leaving them dependent on militias like the Mahdi Army for food, supplies and protection.” (Niva 2008). This forced ethnic segregation in the name of security, according to this author, is part of the overall U.S. military strategy for Iraq which Niva calls “‘clear, hold and divide’.” This strategy has justified not only the division and segregation of Baghdad through walling, but also the use of surveillance through biometric technologies and unmanned aerial vehicles. It is part of a longer historical trajectory of peacekeeping that has argued that cities divided can be homogenized and thus secured.
The walling of Iraq should also be situated in relation to the practice of city division that has been instituted in places perceived to exhibit sectarianism (MacAskill, 2007). As one resident of Sadr City reflects upon the removal of a wall – “We called it our Berlin Wall” (Healy 2011). But there are other precedents of city divisions alongside ethnic lines under the pretext of sectarian violence that are more similar to the situation in Baghdad. In their book Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia, Jon Calame and Esther Charlesworth outline the general patterns of division that characterize life in partitioned cities. They situate their comparative study within the context of the rise of intrastate civil wars in the world – “of the 64 wars between 1945 and 1988, 59 were intrastate or ‘civil’ wars, and about 80 percent of those who perished were killed by someone in their own nationality” (2009: 2). In the 1990s, this trend reached its height and was referred to the “Third World War” – “the systematic and violent disintegration of weak states into statelets controlled by regional ethnic rivals” (ibid.).

This historical context links the practice of partitioning cities through walling to the larger discourse of failed states – states that lack strong sovereignty and thus theoretically function as potential or actualized states of nature. The establishment of the walls within Baghdad appeared in a moment in which Iraq was considered a failed state, plagued by internal enemies, or foes to use Carl Schmitt’s terminology. “Clear, hold, and divide” thus is a securitization agenda for responding to violence from within a framework that fears the dissolution of the state into a state of nature and thus the triumph of the foe over the sovereign (Niva, 2008). City division, and walling more specifically, has come to reinforce statehood at a micro-level – to create microcosms in which a secured state could be envisioned as territory becomes bounded and population becomes anchored to empty homogeneous space.

Walls and Architecture of In/security

The walling of Baghdad sits in the context of the shoring up of the modern state more broadly as well as in the specific historical context of the U.S.-led War on Terror. In/security is both however a structuring mechanism of the modern state as well as a driving principle of the post 9/11 global nomos. On a conceptual level, insecurity is manifest with the introduction of what Foucault calls the apparatus of security in the 18th century (Foucault, 2004). Giorgio Agamben situates security as the driving legitimizing principle of today’s Western state and warns that “[a] state which has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic” (2001). This primacy of security as “the basic principle of state activity” also speaks about the prevailing assumption of insecurity that underpins the drive for security (Ibid.). As Torin Monahan has argued, “terrorist threats have come to epitomize modern insecurity” and “terrorism has indeed challenged the principles of the apparatus of security” precisely because as an unknown it threatens the institutions that are in charge of the administering of security (2010: 6).
Walls aim to visualize and enforce explicit or implicit borders, to separate citizens from enemies. As Jones has illustrated, borders and enclosures are “inherently violent, engendering systematic violence to people and the environment” (2016: 10). It is in the display of devices of control and conscription of movement that borders are able to demonstrate their effectiveness, their power. Their presence alone functions as a symbolic “visual representation of power of the city and state” (ibid.: 92). But as this same author suggests, their effectiveness is uneven (ibid.). Rather than seeing walls as symbols of security, Peter Marcuse has argued that walling is an example par excellence of architecture of insecurity (1997: 102). While Wendy Brown has asserted that “[n]othwithstanding their strikingly physicalist and obdurate dimensions, the new walls often function theatrically, projecting power and efficaciousness that they do not and cannot actually exercise and they also performatively contradict” (2010: 25). As such, they function both as securitization mechanisms and as markers of a climate of insecurity. In other words, walls are visible and visual symptoms of insecurity as well as disciplinary means through which insecurity is being managed.

Walls, in the context of a post-9/11 United States as well as U.S.-led militarized state-building projects abroad represent futile efforts to enforce security in times of increasing extra-territorial power formations, such as migration, global capital, as well as terrorism. They stand as attempts to implement the fortification logic in the context of globalization, terrorism, and the resulting fear of weakening nation-state sovereignty. Here, boundaries are no longer able to regulate the flow of population. As such, these walled gated communities attempt to articulate networks of secured spaces. Security, once articulated as continuous in relation to a territorially bounded nation-state, becomes reworked as distributed. Walls attempt to classify and thus elucidate the population and territory that lie inside. This illumination, however, as Goldberg has argued, operates through an exclusion of the opaque and illegible (2015). In other words, what lies inside the wall is meant to be known, transparent, empirical, accountable. The wall demarcates and separates by excluding those who are unknown, unidentifiable, opaque, illegible. Walls, however, are responding to an imaginary, idealized continuous security framework, rather than to the contemporary context of a distributed, discontinuous, risk-driven security schema. The walling of Baghdad displays the inability of this falsely glorified apparatus of continuous security to secure through visualization and segregation a neighborhood, let alone a state. It was a futile effort implemented with the expectation that if it was successful, the case would give grounds for scaling up this paradigm to the level of the entire state.

**Conclusion: Techniques of In/security**

Both mapping and walling operate as key disciplinary techniques under the framework of in/security. Both aim to make legible and thus manageable certain segments of population and territory, while obscuring into emptiness or illegibility respectively those deemed as “others.” The mapping and walling projects
implemented in Baghdad during times, in which Iraq was considered a failed state, represented an unsuccessful attempt to export and establish micro-level continuous security spatial model in the context of failed state sovereignty. The mapping of the city through satellite imagery provided a two-fold rendition via both cartography and photography of a heterogeneous place of everyday life into a terrain that can be emptied and subsequently repopulated. Walling became the materialization of political power that the line constructs as an imaginary geography. With its borderlines actualized, the “gated communities” of Baghdad signaled the failure of the United States to summon its sovereignty over the territory and people of Iraq. The 10-feet concrete walls, which now lay in ruin within Baghdad as new walls were being raised in 2016 for protection against rural Shia and members of ISIS around Baghdad, symbolize a violent and ineffective architecture of insecurity that benefits no one. They are a reminder of the importance to embrace the transcendental diversity and complexity of places and people that constitute everyday life.

Figure 1. Diagram of the Wall that would transform the neighborhood of Adhamiya into a “gated community” in April 2007. Image posted by Zeyad Kasim on his blog Healing Iraq. <http://healingiraq.blogspot.com/2007_04_01_healingiraq_archive.html#4421486796771985877>
Figure 2. In Baghdad, Americans are putting up walls to secure neighborhoods. Credit Ali Haider/European Pressphoto Agency/Shutter Stock.

References


Charting the Territory


